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TURNOVER ACTIONS AND THE “FLOATING CHECK” CONTROVERSY 
 




When a debtor files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a Chapter 7 trustee is 
appointed and is charged with collecting and reducing to money the 
property of the bankruptcy estate. One of the most basic collection 
methods a trustee possesses is its turnover power under § 542(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to § 542(a), an entity in possession, custody, 
or control, during the bankruptcy case, of property that the trustee may 
use, sell, or lease, must deliver to the trustee, and account for, such 
property or the value of such property. 
An interesting issue has arisen that is placing debtors in very 
problematic situations. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, debtors are writing 
and issuing checks, but the checks are not clearing until after the 
bankruptcy case is filed. Armed with the § 542(a) collection power, 
trustees are demanding that the debtor replenish the bankruptcy estate 
and turn over the account balance that existed on the date the debtor 
filed for bankruptcy. But debtors are refusing to comply with this demand 
because the funds represented by the checks are no longer in the 
account. So who is responsible for replenishing the estate for the 
transferred funds? Is the onus on the debtor to turn over the funds, even 
if those funds have been transferred from the estate to the payees? Or 
does the trustee bear the burden to seek the postpetition payments from 
the payees of the checks through avoidance actions? 
This Article examines the “floating check” controversy and the 
language of § 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. It also examines a Chapter 
7 trustee’s duties to maximize the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of 
creditors. This Article then reviews one of the leading cases on the 
floating check controversy, which holds that a debtor is not liable to the 
bankruptcy estate for the value of the funds if she lacks current 
possession or control of the actual funds at the time the trustee makes the 
demand for turnover. Several courts have followed this decision. These 
courts rely on pre-Bankruptcy Code practice and hold that turnover is 
permissible only when the entity has possession or control of the 
property at the time the turnover action is filed. Some of these courts also 
justify their decisions with policy-based arguments, analyzing who is in 
the best position to prevent transfers by postpetition check and remedy 
the damages to the bankruptcy estate. 
                                                          
* © 2013 David R. Hague. Assistant Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. I 
would like to thank Professor Chad Pomeroy and Professor Stephen Ware for their helpful 
comments. 
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After examining these arguments, this Article uses the relevant 
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code governing the status of 
funds represented by an issued check to argue that a payee of a check 
only obtains possession and control of those funds represented by the 
check once the funds are available to the payee. This Article then argues 
that the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code altered the pre-Code “current 
possession or control” requirement because § 542(a) expressly permits a 
trustee to recover “the value” of the property, in addition to the property 
itself, from one who possessed the property at any time “during the 
case.” As such, this Article concludes that if a debtor writes checks 
against funds prepetition, but the checks do not clear the debtor’s 
account until after she files for bankruptcy, the trustee is entitled to a 
money judgment against the debtor for the value of the funds. 
Finally, while this Article addresses the policy concerns, it raises a 
new approach that courts have failed to consider. Instead of analyzing 
who is in the better position to prevent transfers by postpetition checks or 
which party is in the best position to remedy the damages to the 
bankruptcy estate, this Article poses a simple question: which approach 
for recovering the funds is in the best interest of the estate and its 
creditors? This Article concludes that a Chapter 7 trustee has several 
nonexclusive remedies and, in the exercise of her business judgment, may 
choose whatever recovery method is in the best interest of the estate. At 
times, recovering from the debtor might make the most sense because 
such remedy allows the trustee to recover the value of all the prepetition 
checks from one source and without having to commence a lawsuit. 
Sometimes, however, recovering the funds from the payees of the checks 
provide the greatest return. Not only does this approach comport with 
the trustee’s duties under the Bankruptcy Code to maximize a return to 
creditors, but it is what § 542(a) and the Bankruptcy Code allow. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“Timing is everything in bankruptcy.”1 Shortly before filing for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, a debtor writes several checks from her checking account, but before 
the payees of the checks present them to the bank for payment, the debtor files for 
bankruptcy. A few days later—after the bankruptcy filing—the checks clear, 
leaving only a few dollars in the debtor’s bank account. 
When a debtor files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a new legal person—the 
estate—is automatically created. A Chapter 7 trustee is appointed to act on behalf 
of the estate and is charged with collecting and reducing to money the property of 
                                                          
1 In re Pauls, No. 10-13887, 2011 WL 6096292, at *1 (Bankr. D. Kan. Dec. 5, 2011). 
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the estate.2 It is ultimately the trustee’s duty to collect property of the estate “as 
expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of the parties in interest.”3 
One of the most basic collection methods a trustee possesses is her turnover power 
under § 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 542(a) requires any entity that is 
in possession, custody, or control of property4 that the trustee may use, sell, or 
lease to turn that property over to the trustee and account for such property or its 
value.5 
In administering the bankruptcy estate, the trustee typically reviews the 
debtor’s bank account statements to determine if there were funds in her account 
on the date the debtor filed for bankruptcy. In the example above, because the 
checks did not clear the debtor’s bank account until after the filing date—
postpetition—there were clearly funds in her bank account when she filed for 
bankruptcy. As a result, the trustee files a turnover action against the debtor, 
pursuant to § 542(a), demanding the debtor to turn over to the estate the account 
balance that existed on the date the debtor filed for bankruptcy. Because the funds 
represented by the checks are no longer in the account, however, the debtor refuses 
to (or simply cannot) comply with the trustee’s demands. 
Are the funds that the bank used to honor the checks property of the debtor’s 
bankruptcy estate and, therefore, subject to turnover? If so, who is responsible for 
replenishing the estate for the transferred funds? Is the debtor responsible even 
though she no longer has control or possession of the funds in the account and 
even if it means she will have to pay the funds twice—once to the payees to whom 
the checks were originally payable and the second time to the trustee? Is the 
trustee’s only remedy against the payees through separate avoidance actions? Or 
does the trustee have the choice whether to recover from the debtor or the payees? 
Nearly all bankruptcy court decisions addressing this floating check 
controversy agree that if the funds are still in the debtor’s bank account on the 
petition date, then such funds are property of the estate. But § 542(a)’s second 
requirement of “possession, custody, or control during the case” is not clear-cut, 
and courts have split over its interpretation. Some hold that the trustee bears the 
burden to seek the postpetition payments from the payees of the checks since the 
debtor no longer has current possession or control of the funds, while other courts 
put the onus on the debtor to turn over the funds, even if those funds have been 
transferred by the debtor’s bank to payees. 
This Article argues that the latter courts are correct. If a debtor writes checks 
against funds prepetition, but the checks do not clear the debtor’s account until 
after she files for bankruptcy, the trustee—if she so chooses—is entitled to a 
                                                          
2 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2006). All future statutory references are to the Bankruptcy 
Code as amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2006), unless otherwise noted. 
3 Id. § 704(a)(1). 
4 The “property” referred to in § 542(a) is essentially “property of the estate.” See id. 
§ 541(a)(1) (defining property of the debtor’s estate as “all legal or equitable interests of 
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case”). 
5 Id. § 542(a). 
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money judgment against the debtor for the value of the funds. Not only does this 
view comport with the plain language of § 542(a), but it also may be the most 
practical and efficient way to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate. Some 
courts that have considered the floating check controversy fail to consider the 
relevant provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) governing the 
status of funds represented by an issued check. And several courts support their 
holdings on pre-Bankruptcy Code practice without accounting for the text of the 
current Bankruptcy Code. These courts hold that § 542(a) permits a trustee to 
compel turnover only from entities that have control of property of the estate at the 
time of the turnover demand. But what is absent in these courts’ decisions is 
appropriate deference to the Bankruptcy Code’s language giving the trustee the 
right to compel the delivery of “the value of such property”6 instead of the property 
itself. Similarly, several courts take the position that the trustee is in a better 
position than the debtor to recover funds from payees and, therefore, this somehow 
obligates the trustee to pursue these payees instead of the debtor. Such reasoning is 
flawed and inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code and the trustee’s duties to 
maximize the estate as “expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of 
parties in interest.”7 
Part II of this Article provides an overview of Chapter 7 bankruptcy. It begins 
by discussing a debtor’s duties to cooperate as necessary to enable a Chapter 7 
trustee to perform the duties given it under the Bankruptcy Code. One of those 
duties is to use its ability to compel the turnover of property of the estate to the 
trustee pursuant to § 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. This power is what entitles a 
trustee to recover a money judgment against the debtor for the value of funds 
withdrawn postpetition, even if the debtor no longer has possession or control of 
such funds. 
Part III of this Article examines the language of § 542(a) and the elements a 
trustee would need to establish to prevail on a § 542(a) turnover claim. In addition, 
Part III examines one of the leading cases siding with the debtor on the floating 
check controversy—Brown v. Pyatt (In re Pyatt).8 This case holds that a debtor is 
not liable to the bankruptcy estate for the value of the funds if she lacks current 
possession of the actual funds at the time the trustee makes the demand for 
turnover.9 Several courts have followed the Pyatt decision. This Article argues that 
Pyatt’s reasoning is without merit and should not be followed. 
Part IV argues that for a trustee to maintain a turnover action against the 
debtor, the trustee need only prove that the funds in the debtor’s bank account are 
property of the estate and that the debtor had control over the funds at some point 
during the bankruptcy case. To satisfy these elements, Part IV uses the relevant 
provisions of the U.C.C. and further compares the pre-Code “present possession” 
requirement against the plain language of the current Bankruptcy Code. 
                                                          
6 Id. 
7 Id. § 704(a)(1). 
8 486 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 2007). 
9 Id. at 429–30. 
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Finally, while Part IV addresses the policy concerns that have been raised by 
several courts regarding the floating check controversy, it also raises a new 
approach that has not been addressed by the courts. Specifically, Part IV poses the 
following question: Which approach for recovering the funds is in the best interest 
of the estate and its creditors? Several courts that analyze the floating check 
controversy err in concluding that the crucial question is who is in the better 
position to prevent transfers by postpetition checks or which party is in the best 
position to remedy the damages. Rather than focusing on these issues, this Article 
argues that the proper analysis is not necessarily which party is in a better position, 
but which method of recovering the funds provides the greatest return to the 
bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Code requires the trustee to collect property of 
the estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of the parties in 
interest. As set forth in Part IV, a trustee has a choice of nonexclusive remedies. In 
some cases, recovering the funds from the debtor will provide the greatest return to 
creditors. But in other cases, recovering the funds from the payees might be more 
efficient and in the best interests of the estate. The point is that a trustee has 
options under the Bankruptcy Code, and the business judgment rule governs her 
choices. This approach—and more specifically the trustee’s right to choose her 
remedy—is supported by the plain language of § 542(a) and comports with the 
trustee’s duties under the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
II.  OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY 
 
A.  Bankruptcy—In General 
 
To fully understand the floating check controversy, one must understand 
general bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy law is federal law. “The substantive 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 are found in Title 11 of the 
United States Code and are referred to as the ‘Bankruptcy Code’ or simply the 
‘Code.’”10 There are two overall forms of bankruptcy relief: (1) liquidation, and (2) 
rehabilitation or reorganization. The Bankruptcy Code divides the substantive law 
of bankruptcy into the following five chapters:11 (1) Chapter 7 cases, (2) Chapter 9 
cases,12 (3) Chapter 11 cases,13 (4) Chapter 12 cases,14 and (5) Chapter 13 cases.15 
                                                          
10 THOMAS J. SALERNO ET AL., ADVANCED CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE § 1.4 
(2013). The jurisdiction, venue, and administrative provisions appear in Title 28 of the 
United States Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006) (jurisdiction); id. §§ 1408–1410 (venue); id. 
§ 1411 (jury trial); id. § 1452 (removal of cases from state courts); id. §§ 151–155 
(judgeship provisions); id. § 156 (administrative/staff); id. § 157 (referral of cases from 
district court to bankruptcy courts); id. § 158 (appellate procedures, creation of bankruptcy 
appellate panels); id. § 1930 (filing fees); id. § 602 (creation of private panel of trustees); 
id. §§ 581–589 (U.S. trustees); id. at § 959 (capacity of trustees to be sued). 
11 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532. 
12 Chapter 9 is available only to a municipality and only by means of a voluntary 
petition. Id. § 109(c). 
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The availability of each of these chapters, however, is based on characteristics of 
the debtor at the time of filing.16 
“Bankruptcy serves to mitigate the effects of financial failure.”17 For debtors 
who are individuals, the Bankruptcy Code affords the possibility of a fresh start 
through the bankruptcy discharge, as well as the ability to restructure their debts in 
certain circumstances. The Supreme Court of the United States has long stated that 
“[t]he principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to the 
‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’”18 
While state law focuses on individual action by a particular creditor and puts a 
premium on quick action by that creditor (e.g., the first creditor to execute on the 
property wins), bankruptcy, on the other hand, compels more of a collective 
creditor action and emphasizes equality of treatment, rather than a sprint to the 
courthouse and to the debtor’s assets.19 Indeed, after a debtor files for bankruptcy, 
a creditor cannot improve its position vis-à-vis other creditors by seizing assets of 
the debtor or taking further action against the debtor or the property of the estate to 
                                                          
13 Chapters 11 and 13 deal generally with debtor rehabilitation or reorganization, not 
liquidation of the debtor’s assets. DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY AND RELATED LAW IN 
A NUTSHELL 21 (8th ed. 2013). Typically, in a Chapter 11 or 13 case creditors look to 
future earnings of the debtor, not the property of the debtor at the time of the bankruptcy 
petition, to satisfy their claims. The debtor usually retains its assets and makes payments to 
creditors pursuant to a court-approved plan. Chapter 11, like 7, is available to all forms of 
debtors—individuals, partnerships, and corporations. Chapter 13, on the other hand, can 
only be used by individuals with regular income who have unsecured, noncontingent, and 
liquidated debts of less than $360,475 (adjusted periodically) and secured debts of less than 
$1,081,400 (adjusted periodically). 11 U.S.C. § 109(e); id. § 104 note (Supp. 2011) 
(adjustment of dollar amounts). 
14 Chapter 12 was added in 1986 because of what was perceived to be a major 
economic crisis in the farming community, particularly with respect to farms that had been 
held in the family over a long period of time. It was difficult or impossible for the farmer to 
use Chapter 11 because the absolute priority rule would require the farmer to give up all 
equity in the property to the mortgagee when loan payments went into default. J. David 
Aiken, Chapter 12 Family Farmer Bankruptcy, 66 NEB. L. REV. 632, 632 (1987). 
15 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1330 (2006). 
16 The focus of this Article is on Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Turnover actions under § 
542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code are predominantly commenced by trustees in Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, and nearly every court to address the floating check controversy has done so in 
Chapter 7 cases. In Chapter 11 and 13 cases, the debtor is typically allowed to keep her 
property through a reorganization. Accordingly, the issue presented by this Article 
typically does not arise in Chapter 11 and 13 cases. 
17 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01[1], at 1-4 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 16th ed. 2012). 
18 Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (quoting Grogan v. 
Garner, 498 U. S. 279, 286, 287 (1991)); see also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 
244 (1934) (“One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to ‘relieve the honest 
debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh . . . .’” 
(quoting Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1914))). 
19 See EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 44. 
2013] TURNOVER ACTIONS AND THE “FLOATING CHECK” CONTROVERSY 69 
 
collect its claims.20 To that end, the filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically 
stays, that is, it “restrains, creditors from taking further action against the debtor, 
the property of the debtor, or the property of the estate to collect their claims.”21 
The automatic stay is one of the most important protections in the Bankruptcy 
Code.22 Obtaining the protections of the automatic stay is often the primary reason 
for filing a bankruptcy petition. Congress, in enacting the Bankruptcy Code, was 
quite clear as to the purpose of the stay: 
 
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections 
provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell 
from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all 
foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or 
reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures 
that drove him into bankruptcy.23 
 
The stay is also fundamental to other policies underlying the Bankruptcy 
Code: equal distribution to creditors of equal priority and orderly administration of 
the estate.24 It ends the state law policy of a “race to the court house” or “first 
come, first serve” and replaces it with the Bankruptcy Code policy of equal 
treatment to similarly situated creditors.25 
                                                          
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 The automatic stay is so named because it becomes effective automatically upon 
the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The debtor does not have to do anything to make it 
effective. The creditor has the burden of moving to get the stay lifted. It is no excuse that 
the creditor did not have notice of the filing before the action was taken. The action will 
still be set aside as void. See, e.g., Ellis v. Consol. Diesel Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371, 372–
73 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding summary judgment void where entered prior to lifting 
automatic stay). 
23 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977); see also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 49–51 (1978) 
(describing how the automatic stay “also provides creditor protection” by “provid[ing] an 
orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated equally,” and further 
defining automatic stay). 
24 See, e.g., In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795, 798–99 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (“The stay 
insures that the debtor’s affairs will be centralized, initially, in a single forum in order to 
prevent conflicting judgments from different courts and in order to harmonize all of the 
creditors’ interests with one another.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
25 Generally, the automatic stay remains in effect until the particular property is no 
longer property of the bankruptcy estate, the court enters an order granting relief from the 
stay, the case is closed or dismissed, or a discharge is granted or denied. 11 U.S.C. § 
362(c)–(d) (2006). Lenders have attempted to circumvent the automatic stay by including 
provisions within loan documents that protect them from the automatic stay. Courts have 
generally been loath to accept such provisions. See, e.g., In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 115 
B.R. 34, 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). Section 362 sets forth the categories of actions that 
are stayed by the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 
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The automatic stay is particularly significant in Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases 
and in relation to the floating check controversy. Indeed, if a debtor files a Chapter 
7 petition, the appointed Chapter 7 trustee needs time to collect the property of the 
estate (e.g., funds in the debtor’s bank account) and make pro-rata distributions to 
creditors. Continued creditor actions against the debtor and property of the estate 
would inevitably interfere with the trustee’s orderly bankruptcy administration. 
 
B.  Chapter 7 Bankruptcy 
 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code is entitled “Liquidation” or “Straight 
Bankruptcy” and is the most common chapter used by debtors. Its purpose is to 
provide debtors with a fresh start. In a Chapter 7 case, a trustee is appointed and 
her duty is to collect the nonexempt property of the debtor, convert that property to 
cash, and distribute that cash to creditors in accordance with the distribution 
scheme of the Bankruptcy Code.26 Essentially, the debtor gives up all nonexempt 
property she owns at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition in exchange 
for a discharge of all her debts.27 
In a very simplified overview, the basic stages of a Chapter 7 case are: (1) the 
Chapter 7 petition is filed, (2) the filing of the petition results in the stay of creditor 
collection activity28 and the appointment of a trustee to administer the case,29 (3) 
the debtor exercises exemption rights with respect to her property,30 (4) the trustee 
collects and sells or liquidates any property available for distribution to the 
creditors,31 (5) the proceeds from the sale of the property are used to pay 
administration expenses and the claims of the creditors according to the 
Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme,32 and (6) the debtor may be discharged from 




                                                          
26 11 U.S.C. § 704(a). 
27 The right to a discharge is not absolute, and some types of debt are not discharged. 
For example, if the debtor has committed some bad act enumerated in § 727 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the debtor may not be entitled to any discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a). 
Moreover, certain enumerated debts set forth in § 523(a) are not dischargeable. Id. § 
523(a). Additionally, bankruptcy discharge does not extinguish consensual liens on the 
debtor’s property. Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Young), No. 04-32102, 2007 
WL 1159952, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2007). 
28 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 
29 Id. § 701(a). 
30 Id. § 522(b). 
31 Id. § 704(a). 
32 Id. § 726. 
33 Id. § 727. 
34 Id. § 523(a). 
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1.  The Chapter 7 Petition 
 
Debtors voluntarily file the majority of Chapter 7 cases.35 The process for 
filing is fairly simple. The debtor files the petition, statement of financial affairs, 
and schedule of assets and liabilities, all upon prescribed forms. Consumer debtors, 
but not other debtors selecting Chapter 7, are required to pass an income threshold 
referred to as the “means test.”36 The means test is a formula designed to keep 
bankruptcy filers with higher incomes—or those that could feasibly fund a Chapter 
11 or 13 plan—from filing for Chapter 7.37 
The official forms and schedules list information required of the debtor about 
present and past financial condition. “Much additional information is required, 
some certified under oath by the debtor.”38 These include, among other things: 
 
Identity documents; prepetition financial instruction by an approved 
service; any budget payment plan worked out; copies of “payment 
advices” such as paycheck stubs for the preceding 60 days; itemized net 
monthly income; 12-month projection of income or expenses reasonably 
expected; intentions for redemption or reaffirmation as to collateral held 
under a purchase money security agreement; current tax returns; and 
interest in any I.RA.39 
 
A Chapter 7 debtor is also required to turn over bank records showing the 
debtor’s account balance on the day of the bankruptcy petition.40 Indeed, the debtor 
must “surrender to the trustee all property of the estate and any recorded 
                                                          
35 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2010 REPORT OF STATISTICS REQUIRED BY 
THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 5 
(2011); see 11 U.S.C. § 301. 
36 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). 
37 Id. Interestingly, only filers with primarily consumer debts—not business debts—
need to satisfy this test. Id. In other words, one can have a very high income and still 
qualify for Chapter 7 bankruptcy if one’s debts can be classified as business debts. The 
Bankruptcy Code defines consumer debt as a debt “incurred by an individual primarily for 
a personal, family, or household purpose.” Id. § 101(8). In determining whether debt is for 
a “personal, family, or household purpose” under § 101(8), courts look to the purpose for 
which the debt was incurred. Stewart v. U.S. Trustee (In re Stewart), 215 B.R. 456, 465 
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997). Debt incurred for a business venture or with a profit motive does 
not fall into the category of debt incurred for “personal, family, or household purposes.” Id. 
Most courts conclude that the ratio of the dollar amount of consumer debt to nonconsumer 
debt should be controlling in determining whether the indebtedness is primarily consumer 
debt for purposes of § 707(b). Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 913 (9th Cir. 
1988). Thus, if over 50% of an individual’s total debt arises out of a personal guaranty 
agreement that was executed for a business venture or profit motive, § 707(b) would not 
apply and the individual could file for Chapter 7 protection. Id. 
38 RICHARD I. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 27 (2012). 
39 Id. at 28. 
40 See 11 U.S.C. § 521. 
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information, including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to property 
of the estate . . . .”41 Failure by the debtor to comply with these debtor duties and 
supply this information within the appropriate time limits may result in dismissal 
of the bankruptcy case.42 
 
2.  The Chapter 7 Trustee and His Duties 
 
In every Chapter 7 case, a trustee is appointed. The Chapter 7 trustee is an 
impartial person representing the collective interest of the creditors. A Chapter 7 
trustee is active, controlling and administering the bankruptcy estate as “the 
representative of the estate.”43 The trustee is essentially the successor of the debtor 
and is entitled to collect and reduce to money the property of the estate. The trustee 
also represents the creditors. In that capacity, he may exercise rights that would 
have belonged to creditors before the beginning of the bankruptcy case. Some of 
the trustee’s responsibilities include, among others, the duty to: 
 
(1) Collect and reduce to money the property of the estate and 
attempt to close the estate as soon as possible; 
(2) Account for all property of the estate; 
(3) Investigate the financial affairs of the debtor; 
(4) If necessary, examine proofs of claim and object to the 
allowance of claims; 
(5) If advisable, oppose the discharge of the debtor; 
(6) Furnish information concerning the estate and the administration 
of the estate; 
(7) File periodic operating reports of the operation of the debtor’s 
business; and 
(8) Submit a final report and file with the court a final accounting of 
the administration of the estate.44 
 
Another duty of the trustee is to conduct the first meeting of creditors under § 
341 of the United States Code, often referred to as the “§ 341 meeting.” The debtor 
is required to appear at the § 341 meeting and submit to examination under oath.45 
The scope of this examination is very broad. Indeed, “[t]he purpose of the 
examination is, generally, to ascertain the status of the debtor’s assets and 
liabilities; to determine whether any avoidable or improper transfers have occurred 
                                                          
41 Id. 
42 Id. § 707. 
43 Id. § 323. 
44 Id. § 704. 
45 Id. § 343. 
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or whether assets are being concealed, or whether there are grounds for objection 
to exemptions or discharge.”46 
With the opening of the bankruptcy estate, the trustee should begin to 
promptly assemble the property belonging to the estate. This may include taking 
possession of the debtor’s known bank accounts and books and records, seizing 
vehicles and other property, changing locks at the debtor’s premises, and 
reviewing the debtor’s schedules for nonexempt assets and potential avoidance 
claims. In some cases, the trustee may need to collect property from the hands of 
third persons, or perhaps noncompliant debtors in possession of estate property. 
One of the most basic collection methods is the trustee’s turnover power under § 
542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
III.  SECTION 542(A) TURNOVER ACTIONS AND CASE LAW ADDRESSING THE 
FLOATING CHECK CONTROVERSY 
 
To understand the floating check issue, it is important to understand the 
inception of turnover actions. Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, 
turnover procedures were not prescribed by statute, but rather were considered 
“judicial innovation[s]” derived from the notion that the courts were empowered 
under the Bankruptcy Act (which governed from 189847 to 1978) to “cause the 
estates of the bankrupts to be collected.”48 But the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
court’s ability to recover property of the estate was limited. Indeed, “a court’s 
authority to compel turnover under the former Act was limited to only its own 
summary jurisdiction over the estate’s actual property.”49 The enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code, however, expanded the court’s authority to compel turnover and 
recover property of the estate.50 
In 1978, with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, a substantive cause of 
action for turnover of property of the estate was created by § 542. This section 
allows a trustee to recover property of the estate in possession, custody, or control 
of any entity. The statute provides, in relevant part, as follows: “[A]n entity . . . in 
possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property [of the estate] . . . shall 
deliver to the trustee . . . such property or the value of such property . . . .”51 
                                                          
46 Carla E. Craig, Step-By-Step Procedure in a Chapter 7 Case, in UNDERSTANDING 
THE BASICS OF BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION 173, 182 (PLI Commercial Law & 
Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. A-842, 2002). 
47 The Bankruptcy Act of 1938 significantly amended the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 
Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840; Edward S. Adams & Daniel A. Farber, 
Beyond the Formalism Debate: Expert Reasoning, Fuzzy Logic, and Complex Statutes, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1320 (1999). 
48 Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 61 (1948). 
49 In re Fleming, 424 B.R. 795, 804 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010). 
50 Shields v. Adams (In re Adams), 453 B.R. 774, 777–78 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2011). 
51 11 U.S.C. § 542(a). The term “entity” under the Bankruptcy Code “includes person, 
estate, trust, governmental unit, and United States Trustee.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(15) (2006). 
Thus, nearly everyone is subject to the powers of § 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. See In 
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The purpose of this section is “to expand the trustee’s power to ‘bring into the 
estate property . . . at the time the bankruptcy proceedings commenced,’ ensuring 
that a broad range of property is included in the estate in order to promote the 
congressional goal of encouraging reorganizations.”52 This turnover power even 
“reaches property in the hands of secured creditors.”53 Indeed, a turnover action by 
a trustee “invokes the court’s most basic equitable powers to gather and manage 
property of the estate.”54 
A turnover proceeding may be brought as an adversary proceeding,55 by 
service of complaint,56 or by motion as a contested-matter proceeding if it is 
against the debtor.57 Although the Bankruptcy Code contains no express time 
limitation for the commencement of a turnover proceeding, such an action may 
nevertheless be time barred.58 An order granting or denying a trustee’s turnover 
                                                          
re Sawyer, 324 B.R. 115, 122 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005). Some debtors have argued that § 
542(a) is inapplicable by asserting that the word “entity” cannot include debtors since the 
word “debtor” appears separately in the same subsection. This argument has failed. As 
noted by one court: 
 
“Entity,” which is a defined term, is a set of things, if you will, that includes all 
individuals, partnerships, corporations, estates, trusts, governmental units, and 
the United States Trustee. “Debtor,” in turn, is a subset of this larger group that 
includes only individuals, partnerships, corporations, and municipalities. 
Consequently, it follows that an individual like [the debtors] can be both an 
“entity” and a “debtor” under the Code without contradiction. Or, conversely, it 
does not follow, as the [debtors] would have it, that an individual debtor cannot 
also be an entity within the meaning of the Code. 
 
In re Fleming, 424 B.R. at 801 (citations omitted). 
52 Braunstein v. McCabe, 571 F.3d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. 
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205 (1983)). 
53 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, ¶ 542.01, at 542-3. 
54 Braunstein, 571 F.3d at 122. 
55 Rule 7001(1) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure includes in the list of 
adversary proceedings “a proceeding to recover money or property, other than a proceeding 
to compel the debtor to deliver property to the trustee.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(1). Thus, a 
trustee is entitled to proceed against the debtor via motion since the rule states that a 
proceeding to recover money or property is an adversary proceeding unless it is a 
proceeding to compel the debtor to turn over property of the estate to the trustee. 
56 See id. 7003 (“Rule 3 F. R. Civ. P. applies in adversary proceedings.”). 
57 See, e.g., Toledano v. Kittay (In re Toledano), 299 B.R. 284, 298–99 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that Rule 7001 specifically allows trustees to compel debtors to 
turnover property of estate by motion rather than by adversary proceeding). 
58 See, e.g., In re Fleming, 424 B.R. 795, 805 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) (denying 
trustee from compelling turnover of tax refund under § 542(a) because trustee waited three 
years before seeking to compel). As the Fleming court observed: 
 
Bankruptcy courts are frequently described as courts of equity and laches is 
certainly an equitable defense. But § 105(a) itself empowers bankruptcy courts 
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request is a final order within the meaning of section 158, title 28 of the United 
States Code; therefore, the district court has jurisdiction to hear any appeal from an 
order granting or denying such a request.59 If a party, including a debtor, fails to 
comply with a turnover order, that party is guilty of civil contempt and may be 
punished.60 Furthermore, a debtor’s failure to turn over property and comply with 
the trustee’s demand can also result in the revocation of her discharge.61 
In analyzing a motion for turnover pursuant to § 542(a), “[t]he first question is 
what precisely constitute[s] property of the bankruptcy estate on the date of 
                                                          
to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to 
carry out the provisions of this title.” Moreover, the Supreme Court and the 
Sixth Circuit have held that the Bankruptcy Code takes precedent over equity in 
determining the bankruptcy court’s authority to act . . . . Therefore, while laches 
may seem like a reasonable approach, the court concludes that it is better to 
address Trustee’s delay with the tools already provided by Section 105(a). 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
59 See, e.g., Prof’l Ins. Mgmt. v. Ohio Cas. Grp. of Ins. Cos. (In re Prof’l Ins. Mgmt.), 
285 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that a turnover order “is widely regarded as a 
final order for purposes of appeal”). 
60 See, e.g., Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 59 (1948) (discussing contempt for failure 
to comply with a turnover order); In re Shore, 193 B.R. 598, 603 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) 
(affirming contempt order for failure to comply with turnover order). The bankruptcy court 
“may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the 
provisions of [Title 11].” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006). Section 105(a) “authorizes bankruptcy 
courts to impose sanctions for civil contempt to compel compliance with a court order or 
compensate parties for losses caused by noncompliance.” Scrivner v. Mashburn (In re 
Scrivner), 535 F.3d 1258, 1265 n.3 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Mountain Am. Credit Union v. 
Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444, 447 (10th Cir. 1990)). “The standard for finding a 
party in civil contempt is well settled: The moving party has the burden of showing by 
clear and convincing evidence that the contemnors violated a specific and definite order of 
the court.” Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(citation omitted). In Hansbrough v. Birdsell (In re Hercules Enters., Inc.), 387 F.3d 1024 
(9th Cir. 2004), the court awarded civil sanctions, including attorneys’ fees, when the 
debtor’s principal failed to turn over property of the estate. See id. at 1026–27. The 
defendant in Hercules operated a gymnasium with several pieces of exercise equipment. Id. 
at 1026. When the defendant removed the equipment from the gym, the trustee moved the 
court to compel its return. Id. The court granted the motion and ordered the defendant to 
turn over the equipment to the trustee. Id. When the defendant still failed to turn over the 
equipment, the court ordered that he be incarcerated as a coercive sanction. Id. at 1028. The 
court further ordered the defendant to pay to the trustee “an amount approximating the fees 
and costs incurred by him as the result of [the defendant’s] misconduct.” Id. at 1027. 
61 See generally Walsh v. Bracken (In re Davitch), 336 B.R. 241 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
2006) (discussing a revocation of debtor’s discharge for failure to turn over property of the 
estate or disclose property of the estate). 
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filing.”62 If the property subject to turnover is not property of the debtor’s 
bankruptcy estate, the trustee’s § 542(a) turnover action will undoubtedly fail.63 
 
A.  Property of the Estate 
 
“Section 541 embodies the essence of the Bankruptcy Code. It creates the 
bankruptcy estate, which consists of all of the property that will be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.”64 “It is from this central core of estate 
property that the creditors will be paid.”65 Congress’s intent was to make the 
bankruptcy estate as “inclusive as possible”66 and to construe it generously.67 
Indeed, the property of the estate includes, but is not limited to, “‘all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the 
[bankruptcy] case,’ wherever located and by whomever held.”68 “It would be hard 
to imagine language that would be more encompassing.”69 Section 541(b) 
enumerates those items that are specifically excluded from being property of the 
estate. These exclusions are narrow.70 
“Even though section 541 provides the framework for determining the scope 
of the debtor’s estate and what property will be included in the estate, it does not 
                                                          
62 Ruiz v. Jubber (In re Ruiz), 455 B.R. 745, 748 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2011). 
63 In seeking the entry of a turnover order, the burden is on the trustee to show that the 
property or proceeds are part of the bankruptcy estate. See Maggio, 333 U.S. at 64; see also 
Rish Equip. Co. v. Joe Necessary & Son, Inc. (In re Joe Necessary & Son, Inc.), 475 F. 
Supp. 610, 613 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1979). The general rule is that “[t]he trustee succeeds 
only to such rights as the bankrupt possessed; and the trustee is subject to all claims and 
defenses which might have been asserted against the bankrupt but for the filing of the 
petition.” Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 101 (1966). 
64 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, ¶ 541.01, at 541-10. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 See Baer v. Jones (In re Montgomery), 224 F.3d 1193, 1194 (10th Cir. 2000). 
68 Parks v. FIA Card Servs. (In re Marshall), 550 F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006)). 
69 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, ¶ 541.01, at 541-10. 
70 Id. ¶ 541.01, at 541-10 to -11 (“Enumerated exclusions consist of powers that the 
debtor may exercise solely for another’s benefit, any interest of the debtor as lessee under a 
lease of nonresidential real property after the expiration of the lease term, the debtor’s 
eligibility to participate in Higher Education Act programs or accreditation or licensure 
status as an educational institution, certain interests in liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons, 
funds placed in a Coverdell Education Savings Account, the debtor’s interest in funds used 
to purchase certain tuition benefits, the debtor’s interest in amounts withheld from wages or 
contributed by the debtor to certain employee benefit or deferred compensation plans, the 
debtor’s interest in property subject to possessory pledges to certain licensed lenders, such 
as pawnbrokers, and certain cash or equivalent proceeds from the sale of a money order 
made within fourteen days prior to the commencement of the case if the proceeds are 
required to be segregated from the debtor’s other property.”). 
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provide any rules for determining whether the debtor has an interest in property in 
the first place.”71 The Supreme Court of the United States has stated, 
 
Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in 
the assets of the bankruptcy’s estate to state law. . . . Unless some federal 
interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests 
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is 
involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.72 
 
Section 541(a) also includes any property recovered by the trustee using the 
turnover powers conferred by § 542. Indeed, Congress intended to include a broad 
range of “property in the estate,” subject to turnover.73 The United States Supreme 
Court has stated: “Although these statutes [(§§ 542(a), 363(a) and (b), and 
541(a)(1))] could be read to limit the estate to those ‘interests of the debtor in 
property’ at the time of the filing of the petition, we view them as a definition of 
what is included in the estate, rather than as a limitation.”74 
With respect to funds in a debtor’s bank account on the petition date, nearly 
all courts that have addressed the floating check issue—even those siding with the 
debtor—agree that if the funds are present in the debtor’s account, such funds are 
property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.75 A small minority of courts, however, 
hold that the funds themselves are not property of the estate, but rather it is the 
debtor’s right to collect the funds from the bank that constitutes property of the 
estate.76 As stated by one court, the debtor 
 
did not own the money in the account, but was merely a creditor of 
Merrill Lynch . . . . Property of the debtor is defined to include “all legal 
or equitable interests of the debtor,” and obviously includes the interest 
that a depositor has in the money in his account, more precisely the 
money owed him by the bank by virtue of the account.77 
 
                                                          
71 Id. ¶ 541.03, at 541-15. 
72 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979). 
73 United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204 (1983). 
74 Id. at 203. 
75 See cases cited infra note 95. 
76 E.g., In re Ruiz, 440 B.R. 197, 201 (Bankr. D. Utah 2010) (“Zions Bank was in 
possession, custody and control of the funds on deposit and the funds belonged to Zions 
Bank on the petition date. The Debtors were in possession, custody, and control of a 
promise to pay from the bank to the Debtors.”), rev’d, 455 B.R. 745 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 
2011). 
77 Boyer v. Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. (In re USA 
Diversified Prods., Inc.), 100 F.3d 53, 55 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) 
(2006)). 
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This minority view is flawed because it attempts to narrow the scope of § 541 (i.e., 
property of the estate). In at least one decision addressing this issue,78 the court’s 
narrow holding that the estate’s interest in the checking account amounted to 
nothing more than a beneficial interest in the bank’s promise to pay the funds held 
in the account (as opposed to the money in the account), was derived from 
language contained in the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Citizens Bank 
of Maryland v. Strumpf.79 
In Strumpf, a debtor had both a checking account and a delinquent loan with a 
creditor bank on the petition date.80 When the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition, 
the bank placed an administrative hold on that part of the funds contained in the 
checking account required to offset any prepetition debt that the debtor owed the 
bank on the loan.81 The debtor brought an action against the bank, alleging that the 
bank had violated the automatic stay because the administrative hold was actually 
an improper setoff of the debtor’s funds in violation of § 362(a)(7)82 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.83 The Supreme Court held that the bank’s actions did not 
constitute a setoff, and thus it had not violated the automatic stay.84 Following that 
holding, the Supreme Court also briefly dismissed the debtor’s contentions that the 
bank had violated the automatic stay, noting that the bank did not actually take 
possession of any of the debtor’s property or exercise control over the debtor’s 
property.85 Rather, the Court held that the bank merely failed to perform its 
promise to pay the debtor the funds held in the account.86 
From the Strumpf holding, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Utah in In re Ruiz took a very narrow view, holding: 
 
[Strumpf] makes clear that funds held on deposit in a debtor’s bank 
account do not belong to the debtor and do not belong to the bankruptcy 
estate. Funds held by a bank consists of nothing more or less than a 
promise to pay, from the bank to the depositor. [Debtors’ bank] was in 
possession, custody and control of the funds on deposit and the funds 
belonged to [Debtors’ bank]. The Debtors were in possession, custody, 
and control of a promise to pay from the bank to the Debtors.87 
                                                          
78 In re Ruiz, 440 B.R. at 197. 
79 516 U.S. 16 (1995). 
80 Id. at 17. 
81 Id. at 17–18. 
82 The automatic stay prevents “the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose 
before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor.” 
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7). 
83 Strumpf, 516 U.S. at 17–18. 
84 Id. at 19–20. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 21 (noting that a bank account “consists of nothing more or less than a 
promise to pay, from the bank to the depositor”). 
87 In re Ruiz, 440 B.R. 197, 201 (Bankr. D. Utah 2010), rev’d, 455 B.R. 745 (B.A.P. 
10th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 
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In rejecting this holding (and disagreeing with other similar holdings), the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) of the Tenth Circuit stated that although the 
language contained in Strumpf does “facially support Debtors’ position, the context 
of that case is entirely different from the case currently before this Court.”88 The 
Tenth Circuit BAP’s reason for rejecting the Strumpf holding in the context of the 
floating check issue was that Strumpf “solely involved the automatic stay and the 
relationship between the bank and the debtor. The issue of what constituted 
property of the estate under § 541 was neither argued nor decided.”89 For that 
reason, the Tenth Circuit BAP stated that the “language in Strumpf is not 
dispositive under the facts, or the [floating check] issue presented, in this case.”90 
The Tenth Circuit BAP further held that the relationship between the bank 
and the debtors was “considerably different than the typical debtor-creditor 
relationship that existed in Strumpf.”91 Indeed, the “[d]ebtors maintained the right 
to withdraw the funds in their account at any time, to direct [their bank] to deliver 
the funds to any third party, or to leave the funds on deposit.”92 The court further 
concluded that “although [the bank] did make a promise to pay the funds in the 
account to the debtors, the checking account constituted much more than that 
promise and Debtors’ rights to those funds exceeded those of a typical creditor.”93 
Finally, the Tenth Circuit BAP recognized that the scope of § 541 (i.e., 
property of the estate) is broad “and should be generously construed” and that “the 
bankruptcy court’s attempts to narrow the scope of § 541 in relation to funds on 
deposit in a checking account does not satisfy the standard the Court must apply 
when considering § 541.”94 With that, the Tenth Circuit BAP adopted the 
“prevailing view of nearly every court to consider this issue by holding that the 
funds in [a Debtor’s bank] account, rather than merely the promise to pay over 
those funds, constitute[] property of the bankruptcy estate.”95 
                                                          






94 Id. (quoting Williamson v. Jones (In re Montgomery), 224 F.3d 1193, 1194 (10th 
Cir. 2000)). 
95 Id. (emphasis added); see also Brown v. Pyatt (In re Pyatt), 486 F.3d 423, 427 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (“[T]he funds transferred by the [prepetition] checks are property of the 
estate.”); Yoon v. Minter-Higgins, 399 B.R. 34, 42–44 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (“Funds on 
deposit, in a debtor’s checking account on the petition date that are not otherwise exempt 
are property of the bankruptcy estate.”); Maurer v. Hedback (In re Maurer), 140 B.R. 744, 
746 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that prepetition checks remain property of the estate until 
honored); Shapiro v. Henson (In re Henson), 449 B.R. 109, 112 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011) 
(“The bankruptcy court held that the checks written pre-petition by Debtor became 
property of the estate because they had not been honored when Debtor filed for 
bankruptcy.”); In re Brubaker, 426 B.R. 902, 905 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010) (“[B]oth schools 
[of thought] agree that the funds are property of the estate.”), aff’d, 443 B.R. 176 (M.D. 
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While the issue of what constitutes “property of the estate” is rather clear-cut, 
the second element of a § 542(a) turnover claim—“possession, custody, or control” 
of that property—presents a thornier issue and one that has been the subject of 
much debate. 
 
B.  Possession, Custody, or Control of Property of the Estate 
 
After a court determines that the subject property is “property of the estate,” 
the next question in analyzing a trustee’s turnover request is whether the party 
subject to the turnover action had “possession, custody, or control” of that property 
“during the case,” such that she can be required to turn over the property, or its 
value, to the trustee pursuant to § 542(a).96 “While it is true that the phrase 
‘possession, custody, or control’ is not defined in the Code, reading the phrase in 
the context with the language of § 541 helps clarify its meaning and purpose.”97 
Section 541 provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he commencement of a case . . . 
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever 
located and by whomever held: (1) . . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor 
in property as of the commencement of the case.”98 “That language . . . indicates 
the very broad scope of a bankruptcy estate.”99 Indeed, “Congress drafted the 
sweeping language of §§ 541 and 542 deliberately to grant broad powers to an 
estate and its trustee.”100 
                                                          
Fla. 2011); In re Parker, No. 05-17912, 2008 WL 906570, at *4 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 
2008) (“[T]he court concludes that on the date the Debtor’s bankruptcy petition was filed, 
the entire $3,275.94 balance in the Trustco Account became an asset of the Debtor’s 
bankruptcy estate under § 541(a)(1).”); In re Parsons, 57 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d. (MB) 273, 
275 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Nov. 17, 2006) (“Funds on deposit in a debtor’s checking account on 
the petition date . . . are property of the bankruptcy estate.”); In re Schoonover, No. 05-
43662-7, 2006 WL 3093649, at *2 (Bankr. D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2006) (“This Court has located 
eight decisions that address this issue. As a threshold matter, all eight decisions agree that 
the money [in the checking account] is property of the estate.”); In re Spencer, 362 B.R. 
489, 491 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (“[T]he funds remained in [the debtors’] possession and 
control at the date of the petition, were property of the estate, and were therefore subject to 
turnover.”); In re Taylor, 332 B.R. 609, 611 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005) (“[P]roperty of the 
estate includes the funds in the account . . . .”); In re Sawyer, 324 B.R. 115, 121 (Bankr. D. 
Ariz. 2005) (“Indeed, a review of Section 541 provides that the collected funds in the 
Debtor’s account became property of the bankruptcy estate either pursuant to Section 
541(a)(1) or (a)(2).”); In re Dybalski, 316 B.R. 312, 316 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2004) (“[T]he 
Funds are property of the estate.”); In re Anderson, 410 B.R. 289, 295 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
2009) (“Funds in the debtors’ checking account, upon which no checks have been written 
as of the date of the petition, are property of the estate.”). 
96 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
97 Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. v. Boyer (In re U.S.A. 
Diversified Prods., Inc.), 196 B.R. 801, 808 (N.D. Ind. 1996). 
98 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
99 Carlton, 196 B.R. at 808. 
100 Id. at 808–09. 
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A handful of courts have held that funds in the debtor’s account as of the 
bankruptcy filing, which were dissipated postpetition, are not subject to turnover 
by the debtor pursuant to § 542(a), even though the funds are property of the 
debtor’s bankruptcy estate. These courts hold that an entity cannot be compelled to 
turn over property that is no longer within its “possession, custody, or control.”101 
The leading case on this issue is Brown v. Pyatt (In re Pyatt). There, when the 
debtor filed for Chapter 7 relief, there was $1,938.76 in his checking account.102 
Postpetition, and before the trustee was appointed and could even make a turnover 
demand, the debtor subtracted the amount of several prepetition checks written to 
creditors when he reported the balance of his checking account apparently leaving 
all but $300 of the $1,938.76 in the debtor’s account.103 The debtor’s bankruptcy 
schedules reflected this asset in the sum of $300, which the debtor believed would 
be the amount left in his account after all the checks cleared.104 At the § 341 
meeting, however, the trustee learned of the true amount still in the account as of 
the petition date, not considering the checks that were honored subsequent to 
filing, and demanded turnover pursuant to § 542(a).105 The bankruptcy court 
concluded that because the assets represented by the checks were still in the 
debtor’s account as of the date of his filing, the trustee was allowed to compel 
turnover under § 542(a).106 
The debtor appealed to the Eighth Circuit BAP, which reversed.107 The panel 
majority concluded that the trustee was in a better position to recover the funds 
paid out by a bank to third parties after the debtor’s filing because the trustee was 
authorized to avoid postpetition transfers pursuant to § 549 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.108 The panel concluded that “[i]f the trustee were to recover the transferred 
                                                          
101 See, e.g., Brown v. Pyatt (In re Pyatt), 486 F.3d 423, 426 (8th Cir. 2007) (requiring 
current possession); Lovald v. Falzerano (In re Falzerano), 454 B.R. 81, 86 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2011); Shapiro v. Henson (In re Henson), 449 B.R. 109, 112–13 (D. Nev. 2011); In re 
Anderson, 410 B.R. 289, 295 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009). 
102 Pyatt, 486 F.3d at 425. 





108 Id. Section 549 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee to avoid unauthorized 
postpetition transfers, subject to certain exceptions. 11 U.S.C. § 549 (2006). The purpose of 
§ 549 is to allow the trustee to avoid specified postpetition transfers that have depleted the 
bankruptcy estate. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, ¶ 549.01, at 549-3. 
 
Examples of postpetition transfers not authorized by the Bankruptcy Code or the 
bankruptcy court that are recoverable by the trustee are payments to prepetition 
creditors, including payments of penalties to a state agency, the placement of 
judgment liens upon the debtor’s property, a deduction made from a debtor’s 
wages to pay a credit union debt, a payment of a postpetition loan and a bank’s 
setoff of funds to apply to prepetition indebtedness. 
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funds, the claims paid by the checks could be reinstated and the recovered funds 
could be distributed equally among all creditors.”109 “The concurring opinion 
disagreed that the trustee [was] in a better position to collect” the funds, but argued 
that “section 542(a) does not authorize any procedure used by the [trustee] because 
the debtor no longer had control of the funds” and, therefore, could not be required 
to turn them over.110 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that § 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code 
requires any entity that “is in possession, custody, or control, during the case,” of 
property of the estate to turn it over to the trustee.111 The Eighth Circuit in Pyatt 
did not dispute that the funds transferred by the checks were property of the 
estate.112 However, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the words “during the case” 
fails to acknowledge the other language of § 542(a).113 While § 542(a) imposes an 
obligation on any entity who comes into “possession, custody, or control” of 
property of the estate after the bankruptcy petition is filed to deliver it to the 
trustee, it says nothing about whether that obligation continues after possession, 
custody or control cease, and does not specify whether an entity that lacks control 
may properly be subject to a motion to compel turnover.114 The Pyatt court also 
relied on pre-Code practice and the 1948 Supreme Court decision in Maggio v. 
Zeitz,115 which held that possession or control of the property by a party at the time 
of the turnover proceeding is required to compel turnover.116 Several courts have 
followed, and continue to follow, the Pyatt holding.117 Pyatt’s reasoning, however, 
                                                          
Id. ¶ 549.03[1], at 549-11. With respect to the floating check issue, a trustee could clearly 
recover the funds directly from the payees of the checks by pursuing avoidance actions 
under § 549. 
109 Pyatt, 486 F.3d at 426. 
110 Id. (emphasis added). 
111 Id. at 427. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 427–28. 
114 Id. at 428. 
115 333 U.S. 56 (1948). 
116 Id. at 65–66.  
117 See, e.g., Lovald v. Falzerano (In re Falzerano), 454 B.R. 81, 86 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2011) (“Moreover, the limitation . . . on the trustee’s right to turnover to the proceeds in 
Rice’s possession comports with the Court of Appeals’ more recent ruling in Pyatt, 
wherein it stated unequivocally that § 542(a) permits a trustee ‘to compel turnover only 
from entities which have control of property of the estate or its proceeds at the time of the 
turnover demand.’” (citation omitted)); Shapiro v. Henson (In re Henson), 449 B.R. 109, 
112–13 (D. Nev. 2011) (“We agree with the reasoning in Pyatt, in which the Eighth Circuit 
considered that argument and expressly rejected it. In the pre-Bankruptcy Code case 
Maggio, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s contempt order on a debtor who was 
unable to turnover property of the estate that it no longer possessed. In short, pre-Code 
practice was that turnover ‘is appropriate only when the evidence satisfactorily establishes 
the existence of the property or its proceeds, and possession thereof by the defendant at the 
time of the proceeding.’ The Supreme Court further clarifies that courts should not look to 
the date of bankruptcy as the time to which the inquiry of possession is directed, but rather 
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is flawed. The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code altered the pre-Code “current 
possession or control” requirement because § 542(a) expressly permits a trustee to 
recover “the value” of the property, in addition to the property itself, from one who 
possessed the property at any time “during the case.” 
 
IV.  THE TRUSTEE’S ABILITY TO RECOVER ACCOUNT FUNDS PAID POSTPETITION 
 
Notwithstanding all that has been decided, it remains unsettled whether the 
trustee can obtain the transferred funds through a motion for turnover against the 
debtor, or whether he must seek postpetition payments from the payees of the 
checks. Nearly all bankruptcy court decisions addressing the floating check 
controversy agree that if the funds are in the debtor’s bank account on the petition 
date, such funds are property of the estate. As the concurrence in Pyatt pointed out, 
“there is no doubt that the funds on deposit in the debtor’s account when the case 
was filed was property of the estate. This is true whether one thinks of that 
property as cash, a credit of some sort, or a debt owed by the bank to the 
debtor.”118 However, the second requirement of a § 542(a) claim (i.e., “possession, 
custody, or control during the [bankruptcy] case”) is not clear-cut and the courts 
that have considered this matter have arrived at completely opposite conclusions. 
                                                          
to the time that a turnover proceeding is instituted. In this case, Debtor does not possess the 
property or the proceeds of the property.” (citations omitted)); In re Anderson, 410 B.R. 
289 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009) (“The Trustee concedes that under the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision in Pyatt, a debtor is not required to turn over money represented by checks which 
had been written prior to the bankruptcy filing, but had not yet cleared until after the 
bankruptcy case was filed.” (citations omitted)). 
118 Pyatt v. Brown (In re Pyatt), 348 B.R. 783, 787 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 2006) (Kressel, 
C.J., concurring), aff’d, 486 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 2007). Since the controversy surrounding 
the floating check issue does not necessarily involve whether the funds in question are 
“property of the estate,” this Article focuses on the dispute with respect to the second 
element of a § 542(a) turnover action: “possession, custody, or control” during the 
bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 542 (2006). It is important to point out, however, that while 
the majority of courts that have considered the floating check issue have analyzed 
“property of the estate” and “possession, custody, or control” separately, this is not 
necessary and, perhaps, is a flawed method. When most bankruptcy courts analyze the 
issue of “property of the estate” in other contexts, they focus heavily on the concept of 
dominion and control. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has held that dominion and control over 
property are the hallmarks for determining whether property is property of a bankruptcy 
estate. See Parks v. FIA Card Servs., N.A. (In re Marshall), 550 F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir. 
2008) (“[A] transfer of property will be a transfer of ‘an interest of the debtor in property’ 
if the debtor exercised dominion or control over the transferred property.” (citation 
omitted)); In re Amdura Corp., 75 F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir. 1996); Amdura Nat’l Distrib. 
v. Amdura Corp., (In re Paige), 413 B.R. 882, 909 (Bankr. D. Utah 2009) (“The Tenth 
Circuit has interpreted [section 541] to mean that property that is titled in the name of the 
debtor and that is under the debtor’s ‘dominion or control’ is presumptively property of the 
estate.”). Accordingly, one might argue that the courts are putting the cart before the horse, 
so to speak, since a determination of what constitutes “property of the estate” can 
oftentimes be made by first analyzing the issue of dominion and control. 
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Some hold that the trustee bears the burden to seek the postpetition payments from 
the payees of the checks through avoidance actions, while others put the onus on 
the debtor to turn over the funds, even if those funds have been transferred from 
the estate to payees. 
As set forth below, § 542(a) not only entitles the trustee to recover from the 
debtor, but it may also be the best method of maximizing the estate and providing 
the greatest return to creditors. 
 
A.  It Is Not Until the Checks Have Been Presented for Payment to the Debtor’s 
Bank that the Debtor Ceases to Have Possession, Custody, or Control of the Funds 
Represented by the Checks 
 
The phrase “possession, custody, or control” is not defined in the Bankruptcy 
Code. When construing a term (where not defined in a statute), it is proper for a 
court to look to its commonly approved usage, an inquiry that is enhanced by the 
examination of dictionary definitions. Black’s Law Dictionary defines possession 
as “having or holding property in one’s power; the exercise of dominion over 
property . . . . Something that a person owns or controls.”119 Custody is defined as 
“[t]he care and control of a thing or person for inspection, preservation, or 
security.”120 And control is defined as “the power or authority to manage, direct, or 
oversee.”121 The phrase “possession, custody, or control” is disjunctive and only 
one of the enumerated requirements need be met. Thus, “actual possession” is not 
required.122 
In the case of transferred funds from a bank account, given that a check is a 
negotiable instrument, the most relevant provisions governing the status of funds 
represented by an issued check, specifically as to who is in “possession, custody, 
or control,” are those found in the U.C.C. Nearly all states have adopted the U.C.C. 
by statute.123 
                                                          
119 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (9th ed. 2009). 
120 Id. at 441. 
121 Id. at 378. 
122 See, e.g., Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. v. Boyer (In re 
U.S.A. Diversified Prods., Inc.), 196 B.R. 801, 809 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (noting that Congress 
wrote the phrase “possession, custody or control” in the disjunctive rather than the 
conjunctive); id. (“Nothing in the phrase indicates that an entity must have any kind of 
‘dominion’ over the property in question . . . . So, while the law firm may not have had 
‘control’ over the money since it could only transfer it pursuant to the directives of its 
client, that did not prevent the firm from having ‘possession’ or ‘custody,’ which is enough 
to make it subject to a turnover action under § 542. To interpret the phrase ‘possession, 
custody or control’ as restrictively as appellant urges would fly in the face of the broad 
intent and purpose of §§ 541 and 542.”). 
123 See, e.g., AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. v. Long (In re Long), 519 F.3d 288, 297 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (recognizing that the U.C.C. “has been adopted by most states”); ABB Power T 
& D Co. v. Gothaer Versicherungsbank VVAG, 939 F. Supp. 1568, 1580 (S.D. Fla. 1996) 
(noting that the “Uniform Commercial Code did not exist before 1952, and most states 
began adoption after publication of the 1962 text”); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 304 
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Under the U.C.C., the payee of an ordinary, uncertified check only obtains 
possession and control of those funds represented by the check once the funds are 
physically present in the payee’s account.124 But simply because a check has been 
issued, does not result in the drawer losing possession and control of the funds. 
Article 3 of the U.C.C. applies to negotiable instruments.125 Section 3-408 
provides that a “check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of 
funds in the hands of the drawee126 available for its payment, and the drawee is not 
liable on the instrument until the drawee accepts it.”127 Thus, upon receipt of a 
check by the payee, the drawer has not effectively assigned the funds in the 
drawer’s bank account pending payment of the check. 
Moreover, regarding whether the funds remain in the drawer’s account and 
hence in the drawer’s possession or control up until presentment, § 3-501 defines 
presentment as: 
 
[A] demand made by or on behalf of a person entitled to enforce an 
instrument: (i) to pay the instrument made to the drawee or a party 
obliged to pay the instrument or, in the case of a note or accepted draft 
payable at a bank, to the bank, or (ii) to accept a draft made to the 
drawee.128 
 
                                                          
F. Supp. 955, 956 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (acknowledging that “nearly all the states have adopted 
the [Uniform Commercial] Code”); Noland v. Wilmington Sav. Bank (In re D & K 
Aviation, Inc.), 349 B.R. 169, 176 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006) (stating that the U.C.C. is 
effective “in most states”). 
124 See U.C.C. §§ 3-408, 3-310(b)(1) (2002). 
125 See id. § 3-102(a). “Negotiable instrument” means: 
 
[A]n unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or 
without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it: 
(1) is payable to the bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes 
into possession of a holder; 
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and 
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person 
promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of 
money, but the promise or order may contain (i) an undertaking or power to 
give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an authorization or 
power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral, or 
(iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection 
of an obligor. 
 
Id. § 3-104(a). 
126 Id. § 3-408. “Drawee” means a person ordered in a draft to make payment. Id. § 3-
103(a)(4). 
127 Id. § 3-408. 
128 Id. § 3-501(a). 
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Presentment has been construed as the point in time where the payee’s bank 
presents the check to the drawer’s bank for payment.129 Significantly, after the 
drawer issues the check to the payee, but before presentment of the check to the 
drawer’s bank, the funds represented by the check undoubtedly remain in the 
drawer’s account and under the drawer’s control. Indeed, it is not until presentment 
that issuance of a check constitutes full and absolute payment.130 
Other indications of “possession, custody or control” are found in Article 4 of 
the U.C.C., which applies to bank deposits and collections.131 Specifically, section 
4-403 deals with the “Customer’s Right to Stop Payment” and provides in part: 
 
A customer or any person authorized to draw on the account if there 
is more than one person may stop payment of any item drawn on the 
customer’s account or close the account by an order to the bank 
describing the item or account with reasonable certainty received at a 
time and in a manner that affords the bank a reasonable opportunity to 
act on it before any action by the bank with respect to the item described 
in section 4-303. If the signature of more than one person is required to 
draw on an account, any of these persons may stop payment or close the 
account.132 
 
Thus, a drawer of a check may issue a stop payment order at any time after the 
check has been written in an attempt to prevent the check from being paid and the 
funds from being transferred to the payee. This right to stop payment is clearly 
indicative of the “possession, custody, or control” a debtor has over funds in a 
bank account. A court should be hard pressed to deny that a debtor is not in control 
over funds in her account if she can actually take steps to stop payment of the 
check.133 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has confirmed that under the 
Bankruptcy Code, a transfer of a check occurs when the drawee bank honors the 
                                                          
129 See Fla. Nat’l Bank at Perry v. Citizens Bank of Perry, 474 So. 2d 852, 853 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (using the term “presentment” in construing the exchange between 
banks where the collecting bank would bring checks to the payor bank and request payment 
for the checks). 
130 See HENRY J. BAILEY & RICHARD B. HAGEDORN, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS 4-16, 
4-19 (7th ed. 1992) (“Since delivery of an ordinary, uncertified check is only conditional 
payment, dependent on the check being honored upon presentment, the check vests no title 
or interest in the payee as to funds on deposit in the drawer’s bank account, and the check 
is deemed revocable by the drawer until it is paid.” (emphasis added)) . 
131 See U.C.C. § 4-101 (2010) (“This Article may be cited as Uniform Commercial 
Code—Bank Deposits and Collections.”) 
132 Id. § 4-403. 
133 In re Schoonover, No. 05-43662-7, 2006 WL 3093649, at *3 (Bankr. D. Kan. Oct. 
30, 2006) (“Debtors also do not, and really cannot, dispute, that they had management of, 
or control over, the funds deposited in the accounts.”) 
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check, not when the payee receives it.134 Accordingly, any time before a bank 
honors a check, the funds represented by that check are within the “possession, 
custody, or control” of the drawer (i.e., the debtor in this case).135 
There are several other factors that demonstrate a debtor’s control over the 
funds in her account. These include, among other things, the ability to (1) manage 
the account, (2) determine when funds will be disbursed and to whom, (3) close the 
bank account, (4) contact the bank and provide notice of the bankruptcy, (5) 
withdraw funds from the bank, (6) use a debit card to purchase goods, and (7) 
transfer funds from one account to another.136 Thus, there can really be no question 
that if, on the day a debtor files for bankruptcy, the issued checks have not been 
honored, the debtor has complete “possession, custody, or control” of the funds 
represented by those checks. But this still leaves the question of whether that 
“possession, custody, or control,” which may last for only a day or a few hours 
                                                          
134 Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 400–01 (1992). The issue of when a transfer is 
deemed to have occurred is regularly discussed in the context of preferences under title 11, 
section 547 of the United States Code. A trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the 
debtor in property if the transfer (1) was made to a creditor, (2) was for payment of debt, 
(3) was made while the debtor was insolvent, (4) was within ninety days before the filing 
of the bankruptcy (one year if the creditor was an “insider” of the debtor), and (5) allowed 
to the creditor to recover more than he would recover in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 547(b) (2006). The date the transfer occurs can provide a significant defense to a creditor 
when litigating whether the payment was made within ninety days. Under Barnhill, the 
“date of honor” rule, not of delivery, applies to preferential transfers under § 547(b). 
Barnhill, 503 U.S. at 400–01. 
In Brown v. Pyatt (In re Pyatt), the Eighth Circuit, citing Barnhill, found that the 
debtor “had control over the funds before the checks were honored.” 486 F.3d 423, 427 
(8th Cir. 2007). Remarkably, when deciding that the debtor was not responsible for 
replenishing the estate, the Pyatt court did not dispute that the debtor had “possession, 
custody, or control” over the funds at some point during the case. Id. The Pyatt court 
recognized that before a bank honors the checks, the funds represented by those checks are 
within the possession, custody, or control of the debtor. Id. 
Relatedly, some debtors have argued that when a creditor presents a check for 
payment postpetition, such act is a violation of the automatic stay. To the contrary, § 
362(b)(11) excepts from the stay “the presentment of a negotiable instrument and the 
giving of notice of and protesting dishonor of such an instrument.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(11). 
135 See In re Parker, No. 05-17912, 2008 WL 906570, at *4 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 
2008) (“The recipient of a check has no right to funds in an account until the check is 
presented for payment.”). 
136 It is important to note that the floating check controversy and the § 542(a) analysis 
are not questions of what a debtor should do, but what a debtor can do. The issue is not the 
debtor’s duty; the issue is the debtor’s control of the funds in the bank account. The fact 
that a debtor can perform all of these tasks, which no courts dispute, demonstrates that a 
debtor has complete control over funds in her bank account until the moment of honor. It is 
the debtor’s control that is the key for purposes of § 542(a), not what otherwise might be 
her duty. It is important to note, however, that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(4), debtors 
have an explicit duty to “surrender to the trustee all property of the estate.” 
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after the bankruptcy case is filed, constitutes “possession, custody, or control, 
during the case,” which is required by § 542(a). 
 
B.  A Debtor’s Control of Her Bank Account Funds on the Date of Filing Requires 
the Debtor to Deliver to the Trustee Such Funds or the Value of Such Funds 
 
As set forth above, several courts make the argument that funds in the 
debtor’s account as of the bankruptcy filing, which were dissipated postpetition, 
are not subject to turnover by the debtor pursuant to § 542(a).137 These courts base 
their decisions upon flawed interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code and outdated 
common practice under the former Bankruptcy Act. Regarding the former, these 
courts conclude that § 542 has to be interpreted as permitting recovery against only 
a person who is currently in possession or control of the subject property at the 
time of the turnover action—otherwise, there could be an unintended double 
recovery. In Pyatt, for example, the Eighth Circuit made the following conclusion: 
 
Here, both the debtor and the debtor’s payees had “possession, 
custody, or control” of the funds at some point after the bankruptcy 
petition was filed. Under the trustee’s reading of the provision, the 
trustee could proceed both against the debtor and against the payees and 
obtain double satisfaction. The code’s drafters apparently did not think it 
necessary to prevent the trustee from obtaining double satisfaction under 
§ 542(a). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 550(d) (prohibiting double satisfaction in 
avoidances under §§ 544, 545, 547–549, 553(b), and 724(a); no mention 
of § 542(a)). The absence of such a prohibition suggests that the drafters 
did not intend to authorize a trustee to proceed under § 542(a) against 
everyone who may have had control over property of the estate at some 
point after the petition was filed.138 
 
This argument raised in Pyatt and the meaning of § 550 of the Bankruptcy 
Code needs further explanation. Pyatt (and other cases) cites to § 550 of the 
Bankruptcy Code for support that an unintended double recovery might occur if a 
                                                          
137 See, e.g., Lovald v. Falzerano (In re Falzerano), 454 B.R. 81, 86 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2011) (holding that § 542(a) permits a trustee to compel turnover only from entities that 
have control of property of the estate or its proceeds at the time of turnover demand); 
Shapiro v. Henson (In re Henson), 449 B.R. 109, 112–13 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011) (holding 
that because debtor no longer had possession of the funds, trustee could not compel 
turnover); In re Anderson, 410 B.R. 289 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009) (“The Trustee concedes 
that under the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Pyatt, a debtor is not required to turn over 
money represented by checks which had been written prior to the bankruptcy filing, but 
had not yet cleared until after the bankruptcy case was filed.”); In re Taylor, 332 B.R. 609 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005) (holding that the trustee may proceed against the payees of the 
checks and not the debtor). 
138 Pyatt, 486 F.3d at 427–28. 
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trustee is allowed to pursue a debtor for the value of the funds transferred 
postpetition. This reasoning is faulty. 
Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a trustee, after avoidance of a 
transfer under the trustee’s avoiding powers, to recover the property transferred or 
the value of the property transferred.139 Section 550 applies only to transfers 
avoided against subsequent judicial lien creditors and bona fide purchasers or 
against actual creditors,140 avoided statutory liens,141 preferences,142 fraudulent 
transfers and obligations,143 postpetition transfers,144 setoffs within the ninety-day 
prepetition period,145 and liens secured by penalties.146 Under § 550, the trustee 
may recover the property itself or, on court order, the value of the property. 
Furthermore, the trustee may recover the property from the initial transferee or a 
subsequent transferee. But the trustee may not obtain a windfall for the estate by 
recovering from multiple transferees so that the recovery is in excess of the value 
of the property transferred.147 “Subsection (d) recognizes the possibility that more 
than one entity may be liable, but that the trustee’s remedy is limited to the 
recovery of property or its value, and not damages.”148 For example, if “the trustee 
could recover under subsection (a)(1) from either the initial transferee or from the 
entity for whose benefit the transfer was made, the trustee may recover from both, 
but only insofar as the recovery does not exceed the value of property or the 
property itself.”149 
Section 550, of course, does not mention § 542(a) because § 542(a) is not an 
avoidance provision. So Pyatt and others150 make the argument that because § 
                                                          
139 11 U.S.C. § 550. 
140 Id. § 544. 
141 Id. § 545. 
142 Id. § 547. 
143 Id. § 548. 
144 Id. § 549. 
145 Id. § 553. 
146 Id. § 724. 
147 Id. § 550(d). Section 550(d) provides that “[t]he trustee is entitled to only a single 
satisfaction under subsection (a).” Id. 
148 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, at ¶ 550.05, 550-27. 
149 Id. 
150 For example, in the recent case of Shapiro v. Henson (In re Henson), 449 B.R. 109 
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2011), the court followed a nearly identical analysis as Pyatt, stating: 
 
Finally, we note that under Trustee’s interpretation of sec. 542(a), Trustee 
might have obtained double satisfaction by proceeding against the debtor 
through a motion for turnover, and against the creditors through motions to 
avoid post-petition transfers of property of the estate. If possession is not 
required, nothing in sec. 542(a) or the provision governing double satisfaction 
would prevent Trustee from doing so. Double satisfaction under sections 544, 
545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) is expressly prohibited under 11 U.S.C. § 
550(d). That provision does not include any reference to sec. 542(a), and the 
absence of such a prohibition lends credence to our interpretation that sec. 
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542(a) is not mentioned, there is nothing that would prohibit a trustee from 
obtaining a double recovery—once from the debtor and once from the payees to 
whom the checks were transferred. This argument borders on the frivolous.151 
It is ultimately the trustee’s duty to collect property of the estate “as 
expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of [the] parties in interest.”152 
Spending additional time and wasting the estate’s resources to collect funds, which 
the trustee has already obtained, would violate his duties under the Bankruptcy 
Code. Furthermore, if a trustee were to actually seek a double recovery, the party 
from whom the second recovery was sought could clearly raise equitable defenses 
against such actions. Most, if not all, states forbid double recovery. Indeed, 
 
[i]t is generally recognized that there can be only one recovery of 
damages for one wrong or injury. Double recovery of damages is not 
permitted, and the law does not permit a double satisfaction for a single 
injury. A plaintiff may not recover damages twice for the same injury 
simply because he or she has two legal theories . . . .153 
 
Furthermore, if a trustee recovered from the debtor under § 542(a) and then 
attempted a double recovery against the payee under § 549, what would prevent 
the payee from asserting a § 550(d) defense and what court would allow a trustee 
to obtain such a windfall? 
Finally, Pyatt’s concern about double recovery is not remedied by the holding 
that an entity is required to have current possession or control over estate property 
to be subject to a turnover action. As correctly stated by one court: 
 
[I]n a case where funds remain in a checking account on the date a 
trustee seeks turnover, both the bank (which would currently be in 
possession of the funds) and the debtor (who would currently be in 
control of the funds) could be the subject of the trustee’s turnover 
demand.154 
 
                                                          
542(a) requires present possession of the property or its proceeds. Our 
interpretation would neatly limit the appropriate defendants of a turnover 
proceeding and the possibility of double satisfaction without resort to an express 
provision such as sec. 550(d), as well as being in accordance with pre-Code 
practice. 
 
Id. at 113 (citations omitted). 
151 See In re Ruiz, 455 B.R. 745, 751–52 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2011) (“[I]t would be 
extremely unusual for § 542(a) to be referenced in § 550(d), as a matter of statutory 
construction. . . . Therefore, little, if anything, should be read into the failure to include § 
542(a) in the provisions of § 550.”). 
152 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1). 
153 25 C.J.S. Damages § 5 (2002). 
154 In re Ruiz, 455 B.R. at 752. 
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Accordingly, the double recovery that the Pyatt court and others fear could still 
occur. 
Another problem with Pyatt’s conclusion—and possibly even a greater 
problem—is that it opens the door for serious abuse of the bankruptcy process. 
Pyatt focuses on the remote possibility of unintended double recovery, but 
completely ignores the consequences of its holding. If, as Pyatt concludes, § 
542(a) actually permits a debtor to use or transfer property of the estate without 
consequence, does this not open the door for debtors to game the bankruptcy 
system? Indeed, under Pyatt’s reasoning, debtors may now be incentivized to 
dissipate assets of the estate under the assumption that as long as they are not in 
“possession” of the property, no penalties will follow.155 For example, in In re 
Anderson,156 a case which follows the Pyatt decision, the debtors argued, “Pyatt 
stands for the proposition that, even though funds in a [debtor’s] checking account 
as of the petition date are property of the estate,” a debtor is “free to write checks 
on such account post-petition, without consequence, up until the time that the 
trustee makes demand for turnover of such funds.”157 Stated differently, if a debtor 
is able to dissipate funds from her checking account before the trustee has a chance 
to review her bank statements and make a turnover demand for such funds, the 
debtor is off the hook—“the trustee must look elsewhere to recover those 
funds.”158 While the court in Anderson essentially rejected the debtors’ argument, 
it is further proof that Pyatt’s interpretation of § 542(a) is flawed and that debtors 
will use Pyatt as a good-faith justification to game the system. Undoubtedly, 
debtors and bankruptcy practitioners alike will read Pyatt to mean that a debtor is 
free to spend or transfer estate funds postpetition until such time as the trustee 
makes demand for such funds.159 
                                                          
155 This could, of course, jeopardize a debtor’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727. But 
 
actual intent to hinder, delay or default must be established and as Pyatt itself 
illustrates, it is certainly possible for a debtor to benefit from postpetition 
transfers made without also [possessing] the requisite fraudulent intent. 
Moreover, [denying] the debtor [a] discharge will not restore to the estate 
property that otherwise could have been distributed to creditors. 
 
In re Fleming, 424 B.R. 795, 802 n.17 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010). 
156 410 B.R. 289 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009). 
157 Id. at 295 (emphasis added). 
158 Id. 
159 Creditors would also have an incentive to game the system. See, e.g., Beaman v. 
Vandeventer Black, LLP (In re Shearin), 224 F.3d 353, 357 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that to 
read § 542(a) as requiring current possession “would enable possessors of property of the 
estate to escape trustees’ demands ‘simply by transferring the property to someone else’” 
(citation omitted)); Yoon v. Minter-Higgins, 399 B.R. 34, 43–44 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (“[I]t 
would be simple for debtors and aggressive creditors to game the system by writing checks 
immediately pre-petition to pay selected creditors while remaining secure in the knowledge 
that the trustees would be unlikely to pursue very small § 549 [unauthorized post-petition 
transfers] actions. This in turn would result in an unfair distribution to those creditors the 
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Thus, Pyatt’s argument regarding the potential of double recovery by the 
trustee to support the requirement of current possession of property in a turnover 
action under § 542(a) is without merit and should not be followed.160 
Pyatt and similar courts also base their decisions on the former Bankruptcy 
Act—despite the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978—as well as the pre-
Code United States Supreme Court case of Maggio v. Zeitz.161 Pyatt made these 
observations regarding the floating check controversy and pre-Code practice: 
 
Precode practice suggests that § 542(a) permits a trustee to compel 
turnover only from entities which have control of property of the estate 
or its proceeds at the time of the turnover demand. Precode practice is 
relevant in construing the bankruptcy code. It is especially instructive 
when interpretation of a “judicially created concept” is at issue, and 
turnover proceedings were an uncodified creation of the courts before 
enactment of the current code. 
The leading case on pre 1978 turnover proceedings is Maggio v. 
Zeitz. There, the president of a bankrupt enterprise was ordered to turn 
over property which he did not have. He was jailed for contempt when he 
did not comply with the order. The Supreme Court held that the president 
was not a proper defendant in a turnover action, for turnover proceedings 
are permissible “only when the evidence satisfactorily establishes the 
existence of the property or its proceeds, and possession thereof by the 
defendant at the time of the proceeding.” The use of a turnover remedy 
was inappropriate “if, at the time it is instituted, the property and its 
proceeds have already been dissipated.” Precode practice thus required 
control of the property at the time the motion to compel turnover was 
brought.162 
 
                                                          
debtors chose not to pay pre-filing and defeat the Code’s policy of promoting a fair 
distribution of the debtor’s assets.”); In re Fleming, 424 B.R. at 805 (rejecting the debtors’ 
“contention that they can in effect exonerate themselves from their responsibility to 
account to Trustee for property that clearly belonged to the estate through the simple 
expedient of having spent it”). 
160 It is worth noting that the debtor may have to pay twice under any scenario. If the 
trustee seizes the money from the debtor’s account, the result may be a bounced check. On 
the other hand, if the trustee pursues the payees directly, the debtor may need to make 
amends with the creditors depending on the nature of the debt. For example, if a debtor 
made a payment to her mortgagee prepetition and the trustee seized the funds representing 
the check to the mortgagee postpetition, the debtor would still have an obligation to pay the 
mortgagee. Since the mortgagee is secured by the debtor’s residence, if the debtor wants to 
remain in the property, she would need to stay current on her mortgage. 
161 333 U.S. 56 (1948). 
162 Brown v. Pyatt (In re Pyatt), 486 F.3d 423, 428–29 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations 
omitted). 
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Pyatt, however, does not adequately appreciate the differences between the 
old Bankruptcy Act and the current Bankruptcy Code, which clearly altered the 
pre-Code possession requirements. Furthermore, pre-Code practice is applicable 
only if Congress, in enacting the Bankruptcy Code, has been ambiguous or the 
pertinent code section (i.e., § 542(a)) requires additional interpretation. But 
“[w]here the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code’s text is itself clear . . . its operation 
is unimpeded by contrary . . . prior practice.”163 
Section 542(a) provides that “an entity . . . in possession, custody, or control, 
during the case, of property . . . shall deliver [it] to the trustee, and account for, 
such property or the value of such property.”164 The plain language of this statute 
provides that current possession is not a requirement under § 542(a).165 “During the 
case” refers to the entire bankruptcy case, not just the moment a turnover 
proceeding is commenced by the trustee.166 And what is further absent in Pyatt’s 
and other courts’ decisions is appropriate deference to the ability of the trustee to 
now compel, pursuant to § 542, the delivery of “the value of such property” instead 
of just the property itself.167 Pyatt acknowledges that § 542 had no counterpart 
under the former Bankruptcy Act, but rather turnover was a product of “judicial 
innovation” derived from the general concept that the courts were able to “cause 
the estates of bankruptcy to be collected.”168 But § 542(a) expanded the power to 
collect assets of the bankruptcy estate. Indeed, § 542(a) now provides a much 
                                                          
163 Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 10 
(2000). 
164 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
165 Hill v. Muniz (In re Muniz), 320 B.R. 697, 700 n.2 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2005) (“The 
fact that a trustee cannot demonstrate a debtor’s possession of estate property at the time 
the turnover action is filed merely means that his remedy becomes a money judgment for 
the value of the estate property rather than an order for turnover.”). 
166 Beaman v. Vandeventer Black, LLP (In re Shearin), 224 F.3d 353, 356 (4th Cir. 
2000) (“We construe the language ‘during the case’ to refer to the entire bankruptcy case, 
not just the adversary proceeding.” (citation omitted)); accord Boyer v. Carlton, Fields, 
Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. (In re USA Diversified Prods., Inc.), 100 F.3d 53, 
55 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying § 542(a) to “[o]ne who during a bankruptcy proceeding is in 
‘possession, custody, or control’ of property” belonging to the debtor’s estate (emphasis 
added)); Rajala v. Majors (In re Majors), 330 B.R. 880, 2005 WL 2077497, at *4 (B.A.P. 
10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished table decision) (“The obligation to turnover extends not just 
to property presently in someone’s possession, custody or control but to the property in 
‘possession, custody or control during the case.’”); Redfield v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & 
Co., (In re Robertson), 105 B.R. 440, 457 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (stating that “[t]he statute 
plainly applies to estate property that was possessed by anyone ‘during the case’, whether 
or not they still have it.”). 
167 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (emphasis added). Were that not true, the holding that debtors 
must repay to the estate the prepetition portion of any tax refunds received, even when the 
debtor has spent the actual refunds monies, would be in doubt. See Barowsky v. Serelson 
(In re Barowsky), 949 F.2d 1516, 1519 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that tax refunds 
attributable to prepetition portion of taxable year was property of the estate). 
168 Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 61 (1948). 
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broader remedy than solely turnover of property held at the time of the turnover 
proceeding, which likely occurs well after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. It 
contemplates the likelihood that a debtor or other entity has had and subsequently 
lost control of estate property.169 
Furthermore, if the statute is read to require current possession of the 
property, as Pyatt and other courts do, then what does the language allowing the 
trustee to alternatively recover “the value of the property” even mean? Such an 
interpretation runs afoul of the “longstanding canon of statutory construction that 
terms in a statute should not be construed so as to render any provision of that 
statute meaningless or superfluous.”170 Under Pyatt’s and similar courts’ reading of 
the statute, “the value of the property” has no meaning.171 As appropriately stated 
by one court: 
 
[I]t is difficult for this court to read the trustee’s ability under [s]ection 
542 to now recover the “value of such property” as an alternative to 
recovering the property itself as simply a reiteration of what Maggio 
recognized was a product of judicial necessity under the former Act. 
Rather, the common meaning of the phrase “value of such property,” 
when juxtaposed with the notion of the property itself being turned over, 
suggests to this court as well as others that Congress intended to expand 
upon Maggio, rather than to just codify it.172 
                                                          
169 See Boyer, 100 F.3d at 56 (“But by the time the trustee got around to demanding 
the money from the law firm, the law firm no longer had it, so how could it deliver it to the 
trustee? The statute, however, requires the delivery of the property or the value of the 
property. Otherwise, upon receiving a demand from the trustee, the possessor of property 
of the debtor could thwart the demand simply by transferring the property to someone else. 
That is not what the statute says, and can’t be what it means.” (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted)). 
170 Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 506 (2000). 
171 See Rajala, 330 B.R. 880, 2005 WL 2077497, at *4 (“[I]f a lack of present 
possession, combined with an explanation, constitutes sufficient compliance, little, if any, 
purpose would be served by the statutory alternative of requiring deliver of ‘the value of 
such property.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
172 In re Fleming, 424 B.R. 795, 804 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010); see also Boyer v. 
Davis (In re USA Diversified Prods., Inc.), 193 B.R. 868, 879 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1995) 
(“Proceedings under § 542 effectively combine both the summary and the plenary remedies 
a trustee was required to pursue under the old Act, thus, allowing the pursuit in a single 
proceeding of relief that previously may have required two separate proceedings. 
Consequently, if the turnover defendant is still in possession of property of the estate, the 
trustee may recover that property. If the defendant no longer has possession of property of 
the bankruptcy estate, the court may inquire into the propriety of its disposition and, if 
appropriate, enter a money judgment in favor of the trustee for the value of such property. 
In effect, turnover proceedings have become what the Supreme Court noted they were not 
under the old Bankruptcy Act. They are not only the means by which the trustee can 
recover specific property of the estate and its identifiable proceeds, but also the means by 
which it can recover ‘damages for tortious conduct such as embezzlement, 
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The text of § 542(a) is plain. And “where, as here, the statute’s language is 
plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’”173 
Funds on deposit in a debtor’s bank account are undeniably “property of the 
bankruptcy estate.”174 The fact that a debtor writes checks against the funds 
prepetition, but the checks do not clear the debtor’s account until postpetition, does 
not defeat the trustee’s right to recover the full amount transferred under § 542(a). 
If the checks do not clear the debtor’s account until after she files for bankruptcy, 
the debtor undeniably maintained control of the funds “during the case.”175 
Furthermore, the statute expressly allows the trustee to recover the “value” of such 
funds representing the checks. Thus, all of the elements required under § 542(a) to 
establish a claim against a debtor for turnover of funds that remained in the 
debtor’s account on the day she filed her bankruptcy petition are satisfied. 
Although one may be sympathetic to a debtor in this situation, the law simply 
provides the debtor no valid defense to the trustee’s turnover action under § 542(a). 
 
C.  The Policy Concerns and the Best Interest of Creditors 
 
Nearly every court to analyze the floating check controversy discusses the 
policy concerns and the difficult position that the parties, particularly the debtors, 
face.176 The reasoning relied on by courts to arrive at their differing outcomes 
                                                          
misappropriation or improvident dissipation of assets.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Maggio, 333 U.S. at 63)), aff’d sub nom. Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & 
Cutler, P.A. v. Boyer (In re USA Diversified Prods., Inc.), 196 B.R. 801 (N.D. Ind.), aff’d, 
100 F.3d 53 (7th Cir. 1996). 
173 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. 
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)). 
174 In re Parsons, 57 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d. (MB) 273, 273 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Nov. 17, 
2006). 
175 11 U.S.C. § 542 (2006). 
176 See, e.g., In re Pauls, No. 10-13887, 2011 WL 6096292, at *2 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
Dec. 5, 2011) (“The facts in this case are lamentable: an elderly grandmother’s attempt to 
assist her granddaughter and husband by co-signing and paying their debts results in the 
debtors being liable for funds they have repaid to her and that she, in turn, has paid to their 
creditor. But unfortunate facts do not soften the outcome that the law coldly compels. 
Randy and Ruth Ann Pauls had control of the $9,713.49 in their checking account on the 
date of their bankruptcy petition and must be ordered to account to the Trustee for it as § 
542(a) requires.” (citation omitted)); In re Brubaker, 426 B.R. 902, 907 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2010) (“Although this Court has an enormous amount of sympathy for the pro se Debtors 
there is nothing in the record to reflect that the Debtors were acting in bad faith or with 
fraudulent intent. The Debtors simply seemed to be depositing funds, allowing debits from 
their account by merchants, and writing checks in the ordinary course.”); In re Sawyer, 324 
B.R. 115, 123 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (discussing the “enormous amount of sympathy for 
the pro se Debtors in this case who apparently acted in good faith”); In re Dybalski, 316 
B.R. 312, 316–17 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2004) (“The result in this case, at least on its face, 
seems rather unfortunate. . . . [T]he Code is primarily intended to give debtors a ‘fresh 
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pertains largely to the parties’ respective duties under the Bankruptcy Code. Courts 
also analyze which of the parties (i.e., the trustee or the debtor) is in the best 
position to prevent transfers by postpetition checks and remedy the damages to the 
estate caused by the transfers. This focus, however, misses the mark. Courts should 
not be focusing on which party is in the best position, but rather what the statute 
requires and which of the remedies available to the trustee provides the greatest 
return to creditors and is in the best interest of the estate. 
In Pyatt, for example, the United States BAP of the Eighth Circuit, in holding 
that the responsibility for recovery of several unauthorized postpetition transfers 
was properly placed on the trustee, and ignoring what was in the best interest of the 
estate, held that the trustee was “in a better position to prevent transfers by 
postpetition check because the trustee can do so without the risk of criminal 
liability.”177 The court further held that “[a] trustee also is in a better position to 
remedy the damage to the estate caused by postpetition transfers because the 
trustee is the only party authorized by the Bankruptcy Code to avoid postpetition 
transfers, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 549.”178 In addition, the court found that 
                                                          
start’ and to equalize distribution among like creditors. The Court does not believe that 
either of these goals is well served here. The Debtors, who may not be in a position to turn 
over the Funds, must essentially pay the same ‘bill’ twice, with perhaps only a marginal 
benefit to the estate, while the creditors who received the Funds are able to retain them.”). 
177 Pyatt v. Brown (In re Pyatt), 348 B.R. 783, 786 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006) (emphasis 
added), aff’d, 486 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 2007). The court further found: 
 
A debtor, on the other hand, runs the risk of being prosecuted for writing a bad 
check if he attempts to stop payment on an outstanding check on the eve of 
bankruptcy. Even though the debtor would likely prevail if he faced criminal 
charges for such conduct, presuming he acted without fraudulent intent, it is still 
inappropriate and unnecessary to place the debtor between the “rock” of 
possible criminal prosecution and the “hard place” of defending a turnover 
action by the trustee. 
 
Id. (citation omitted). 
178 Id. (emphasis added); see also Shapiro v. Henson (In re Henson), 449 B.R. 109, 
113 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011) (“Nor is Trustee left without an adequate remedy under the 
interpretation that a motion to compel turnover may only succeed when the entity has 
current possession of the property. Unlike the turnover provision, which governs the duty 
of an entity in possession of property of the estate during the case to turn over the property 
or the value of such property, sec. 549 expressly provides that ‘the trustee may avoid a 
transfer of property of the estate’ that occurs post-petition.”). The Pyatt court also 
observed: 
 
The bankruptcy court alluded to the possibility that the Debtor might recover 
from the payees of the checks in the amount the court ordered the Debtor to turn 
over to the Trustee, but it did not specify . . . any Bankruptcy Code provision 
that authorizes a debtor to recover funds from postpetition transferees. 
 
Pyatt, 348 B.R. at 786. 
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“because a trustee is the only party the Code authorizes to recover postpetition 
transfers, placing responsibility on the trustee for doing so under these 
circumstances is also the only option that advances the goal of equal distribution 
among creditors.”179 
Finally, the court stated the following: 
 
[W]hether characterized as concern for fundamental fairness or 
practicality, it simply makes more sense to directly collect the 
postpetition transfers from the creditors who received the transfers rather 
than from the debtors who, presumably, innocently made the payments 
prepetition. In a perfect world, there would be a place on a debtor’s 
schedules or statement of financial affairs where outstanding checks 
could be readily listed, thereby alerting the trustee of the possible need to 
notify the bank to stop payment on those checks. In the absence of such 
perfection, however, debtors should be encouraged to disclose that 
information to their attorneys who, in turn, can communicate that to the 
trustee in some fashion. And the transfers that slip through the cracks 
could be avoided by the trustee.180 
 
But what “makes more sense” should not be the focus. There is no question 
that the floating check issue places a debtor in a problematic situation. The funds 
that were in the debtor’s checking account on the date the debtor files for 
bankruptcy are no longer available. Accordingly, this will likely require the debtor 
to pay the funds twice—once to the payees to whom the checks were originally 
payable, and a second time to the trustee.181 Admittedly, this result might go 
                                                          
179 Pyatt, 348 B.R. at 786. The court also explained: 
 
If a trustee recovers from creditors who receive the postpetition transfers of the 
kind at issue here, those creditors’ claims can could [sic] be reinstated to the 
extent of the recovery, and the trustee could then equally distribute that recovery 
among all of the unsecured creditors. In contrast, if a debtor is held accountable 
for checks cashed postpetition (and actually has the money to repay those 
funds), the trustee’s subsequent distribution of those funds would not be equal 
among creditors because the creditors who have received the unauthorized 
postpetition transfers will have already been paid 100 percent of what they were 
owed (to the extent of the transfers), whereas other creditors would most likely 
receive less than 100 percent. 
 
Id. 
180 Id. at 787 (emphasis added). 
181 In most cases, the debtor is not purposefully cheating the bankruptcy estate. 
Rather, the debtor likely wrote valid checks in the ordinary course with the belief that the 
checks would clear prior to filing for bankruptcy. In In re Ruiz, for example, several of the 
checks were made as necessary business expenses, including hay and feed for livestock, 
which, by the time the trustee made demand for turnover, had been consumed by debtors’ 
livestock. In re Ruiz, 440 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Utah 2010). 
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against the Bankruptcy Code’s policy of providing a debtor with a “fresh start” 
through bankruptcy. However, allowing the trustee to recover the value of the 
funds from the debtor may be in the best interest of the bankruptcy estate and 
comports with the trustee’s duties under § 704 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
As set forth in Part II, a Chapter 7 trustee is “charged with marshaling the 
non-exempt assets of the estate for the benefit of creditors.”182 When prepetition 
checks dilute the bankruptcy estate postpetition, the Bankruptcy Code provides 
trustees with various nonexclusive remedies to reimburse the estate.183 Some of the 
remedies include the following: 
 
[Trustees] can give and rely upon the Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2015(a)(4) 
notification to the banks if they have sufficient information to do so. 
They can seek to recover the transferred funds from the payees of the 
checks by pursuing an avoidance action under § 549. Or, they can seek 
recovery of the funds from the debtor without an adversary proceeding 
by invoking either the debtor’s duty to surrender under § 521(4) or his 
duty to turnover under § 542(a). It is ultimately the trustee’s duty to 
collect the property of the estate “as expeditiously as is compatible with 
the best interests of the parties in interest.”184 
 
Thus, a plain reading of the Bankruptcy Code indicates that a trustee can 
recover the funds from the debtor or the payees of the checks through several 
nonexclusive choices.185 As one court has explained, “A Chapter 7 trustee is given 
a substantial degree of discretion in deciding how to administer the bankruptcy 
estate and his or her actions are governed by a business judgment standard.”186 
Accordingly, a trustee has significant discretion in deciding how to maximize the 
estate, and her decisions should not be disturbed if they are reasonable under the 
                                                          
182 In re Parker, No. 05-17912, 2008 WL 906570, at *5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 
2008). 
183 Id. (“While the Debtor is correct in asserting that the Trustee could have sought to 
recover the funds from the payees of the checks by seeking to avoid the post-petition 
transfers, the Debtor does not point to any authority indicating that the Trustee must first 
exhaust his other remedies before he can seek turn over from the Debtor.” (citing 11 U.S.C. 
§ 549 (2006))). 
184 In re Spencer, 362 B.R. 489, 493 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 
704(1)) (adopting the holding of In re Sawyer, 324 B.R. 115 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005), and 
Mauer v. Hedback (In re Maurer), 140 B.R. 744 (D. Minn. 1992)). 
185 Debtors in several cases make the argument that in addition to § 549, recovery 
should come from the payees of the checks pursuant to § 547 (i.e., preferential transfers). 
Section 547 is not applicable. As set forth, supra note 134, a “transfer” occurs when the 
check is honored, but not received by the creditor. Thus, with respect to the floating check 
controversy, the checks, although issued prepetition, are not honored until after the 
bankruptcy is filed, postpetition. Accordingly, the preferential transfer theory asserted by 
some debtors is not an option for the trustee to pursue to recover the funds. 
186 Beery v. Bonzales (In re Beery), No. 7-94-10504, 2007 WL 1575278, at *6 
(Bankr. D.N.M. May 30, 2007) (emphasis added). 
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circumstances. This means that the trustee is not required to prosecute the payees 
of the checks under § 549 (although she certainly can) if it makes more sense to 
pursue the debtor pursuant to § 542(a). 
Pyatt and other courts have opposed this position and have failed to consider 
the best interests of the estate and the trustee’s “substantial degree of discretion.”187 
These courts also disregard the plain language of § 542(a) and instead make 
policy-based arguments that the trustee is in the best position to prevent this 
situation by immediately notifying the debtor’s banks of the bankruptcy filing.188 
Despite misinterpreting the Bankruptcy Code and ignoring the trustee’s duties, 
these holdings assume the trustee receives sufficient information to do so within 
days or even hours of the commencement of the case.189 More significantly, the 
Pyatt court and others assume that the debtor’s statements and schedules will be 
filed immediately and contain accurate information relating to the bank accounts, 
including (1) account numbers, (2) bank names, and (3) actual amounts in the 
accounts. Assuming all of that, courts argue that the trustee has all of the necessary 
information to take quick action. In reality, however, those assumptions are far 
from accurate.190 As often as not, the debtor’s statements and schedules will be 
                                                          
187 Id. 
188 See Pyatt v. Brown (In re Pyatt), 348 B.R. 783, 785 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006), aff’d, 
486 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 2007). 
189 See In re Parker, No. 05-17912, 2008 WL 906570, at *6 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 
2008) (“[T]hese courts place the burden on the trustee, in reliance on the duty imposed 
under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015(a)(4), to notify a debtor’s bank of the 
bankruptcy filing so that no further checks would be honored, or to stop payment on any 
outstanding checks. If a bank honors a check before receiving notice of the filing, they 
assert the trustee could seek to recover from the payee under § 549(a). The problem with 
this rationale is that often a debtor’s check may clear post-petition before the trustee is 
notified of his appointment, assuming the trustee has been provided with all the 
information needed to notify the debtor’s financial institution. More often than not, the 
debtor merely discloses a ‘checking account’ on schedule B, without any identifying 
account information. In addition, most debtors do not identify outstanding checks at the 
time of filing, and it is not until the first meeting of creditors that the trustee learns of these 
estate assets.”); In re Spencer, 362 B.R. 489, 493 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (“In the present 
case (as in many, the Court suspects), the debtors did not identify which bank branches 
held their accounts or the applicable account numbers, making it difficult for the trustee to 
give the Rule 2015 notification. In addition, had the trustee made the notification, both 
banks would likely have frozen the accounts, exposing the debtors to the criminal and civil 
penalties that attend returned checks and thwarting their fresh start by rendering the debtors 
unable to use their accounts at all. Moreover, most of the checks written and honored post-
petition were for a few hundred dollars each. Had the trustee chosen the § 549 route, he 
would be burdened with commencing a plethora of § 549 actions to recover two or three 
hundred dollars. This would be a poor economy to the estate, not to mention wasteful of the 
Court’s time and resources. One could hardly consider it ‘expeditious’ as § 704 requires.”). 
190 See, e.g., In re Ruiz, 455 B.R. 745, 754 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2011) (“This case 
provides a good example why this is not practical [for the trustee to recover the funds from 
others]. This bankruptcy was filed on a Saturday. It would be a rare situation for a panel 
trustee to 1) be sitting in his or her office on a weekend, with staff, in the off-chance a 
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missing or will misstate a piece of crucial information. Indeed, in most cases, the 
debtor’s Statement of Financial Affairs will erroneously indicate the balance that 
they presumed would be in the account after the checks clear.191 Moreover, under 
the Bankruptcy Code, debtors are not required to submit their statements and 
schedules until fourteen days after filing the initial petition.192 This fourteen-day 
period alone eliminates the trustee’s ability to issue notice of the bankruptcy filing 
to the banks in sufficient time to prevent prepetition checks from clearing. 
In all reality, the debtors are clearly in the best position to prevent prepetition 
checks from diluting the bankruptcy estate: 
 
[D]ebtors (especially those represented by knowledgeable 
bankruptcy counsel) are in the best position to prevent this situation. 
First, and undoubtedly the most simple solution, is for debtors to wait 
until all outstanding checks have cleared the bank before filing their 
petition. Second, if immediate filing is required, because of a pending 
foreclosure or otherwise, they can stop payment on the outstanding 
checks. Third, debtors have the option of simply closing the bank 
accounts. Fourth, debtors can contact their banks and provide a notice of 
the filing of the bankruptcy petition, creating a duty on the part of the 
institutions to not pay the checks. It is true that the latter three options 
could theoretically cause debtors criminal problems on the back end, if 
someone suggested these steps were taken with the purpose to defraud. 
As the concurring opinion notes in In re Pyatt, however, “there is clearly 
                                                          
bankruptcy would be filed; 2) that he would necessarily be the one appointed as the panel 
trustee on that new case; 3) that the schedules would show the existence of enough money 
in a checking account worth immediately acting on; and 4) that the schedules would 
provide sufficient information to allow the trustee to contact any listed banking institutions. 
In addition, since all four checks cleared within four days of the bankruptcy filing (and one 
the first business day after it was filed), even if the Trustee had mailed the letter the first 
business day the case was received, he could not have prevented the check from being 
honored.”); In re Parker, 2008 WL 906570, at *5 (noting that “[t]he Debtor did not provide 
the Trustee with his account number or the branch where he does his banking. It was not 
until the Trustee reviewed the Debtor’s bank account statements that he was able to 
ascertain the actual account balance at filing and the Debtor’s account number. Thus, the 
Trustee was not in a position to put Trustco Bank on notice of the filing under Federal Rule 
of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015(a) prior to the checks at issue being presented for 
payment.”). 
191 See, e.g., In re Ruiz, 455 B.R. at 754 (“[I]f debtors are not properly counseled, they 
may inadvertently indicate in their schedules the balance they show in their check register, 
rather than the accurate amount actually still within their account. That is what appears to 
have happened here; Debtors listed the account with $10.02 balance instead of the actual 
amount of $3,764.99. Since panel trustees stand to only receive $60 in a no-asset case, the 
system is not set up to require those same trustees to spend their personal assets to seize a 
$10 bank account.”). 
192 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c). 
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no purpose to defraud if a bankruptcy debtor stops payment on a check in 
fulfillment of the debtor’s duties under a federal statute.”193 
 
Although trustees may have other remedies available, the Bankruptcy Code 
clearly allows a trustee, pursuant to § 542(a), to recover property of the estate 
directly from the debtor. Trustees often do not have enough information in a short 
enough period of time to give the Rule 2015 notification. In addition, even if a 
trustee did have the information soon enough and issued the notification with 
sufficient dispatch, banks would likely freeze the account, exposing the debtor to 
the very criminal or civil penalties the Pyatt court refers to in arguing debtors have 
no duty to issue stop orders on prepetition checks.194 In other words, the 
“potential” criminal liability would appear to attach regardless of who prevented 
the checks from clearing.195 But a debtor’s compliance with her duty under a 
federal statute vitiates any purpose to defraud, and such an argument is nothing 
more than a red herring.196 
Moreover, it is often several, relatively insignificant prepetition checks that 
are honored postpetition. If the trustee were forced to pursue such transfers under § 
549, as several courts suggest, she would be forced to commence several separate 
actions to recover each individual amount.197 As a practical consideration, 
requiring a Chapter 7 trustee to chase down multiple transferees who received 
postpetition transfers will often be impossible or extremely burdensome. In fact, 
the Bankruptcy Code discourages—possibly prohibits—the trustee from doing so. 
Section 704(a)(1) requires the trustee to collect property of the estate and “close 
                                                          
193 In re Schoonover, No. 05-43662-7, 2006 WL 3093649, at *3 (Bankr. D. Kan. Oct. 
30, 2006) (quoting Pyatt, 348 B.R. at 787 n.13 (Kressel, J., concurring)). 
194 See Pyatt, 348 B.R. at 786–87. 
195 As noted by one court, “[M]any, if not most, jurisdictions require the state to prove 
actual intent to defraud when prosecuting an individual for writing a bad check.” In re 
Ruiz, 455 B.R. at 753 n.26. 
196 See, e.g., In re Schoonover, 2006 WL 3093649, at *3 (“It is true that the latter 
three options could theoretically cause debtors criminal problems on the back end, if 
someone suggested these steps were taken with the purpose to defraud. As the concurring 
opinion notes in Pyatt, however, ‘there is clearly no purpose to defraud if a bankruptcy 
debtor stops payment on a check in fulfillment of the debtor’s duties under a federal 
statute.’”). 
197 As the In re Ruiz court noted: 
 
One must also remember . . . that if the Trustee brought an action to avoid the 
post-petition transfer under § 549, and recovered that transfer for the estate 
under § 550, the holder of the note secured by the mortgage, for example, would 
be entitled to a claim under § 502(h) for the amount it was required to return to 
the Trustee. That claim would retain its secured status, leaving Debtors in the 
same position with regard to the amount of money they owed the note holder on 
the secured claim. 
 
455 B.R. at 752 n.23. 
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such estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in 
interest.”198 This duty is also “required by implication from other provisions in the 
Code and in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, especially Rule 1001, 
which provides that the rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of every case.”199 
In short, it is the trustee’s duty to the bankruptcy estate’s creditors to realize 
from the estate all that is possible for distribution among creditors and to this end 
the trustee’s best option—at times—may be to pursue the debtor for the value of 
the funds instead of chasing down multiple creditors, most of whom have already 
been harmed by the debtor’s bankruptcy filing. By recovering from the debtor, the 
trustee can recover the value of all of the prepetition checks from one source 
without initiating a single adversary proceeding. In several cases, such action 
would be in the best interest of the bankruptcy estate and would comport with the 
trustee’s duties under the Bankruptcy Code. 
Furthermore, placing the onus on the debtor to reimburse the estate makes the 
most sense because the debtor is in the best position to prevent prepetition checks 
from clearing postpetition. Only the debtor has the ability to conduct the 
appropriate prepetition planning to prevent this scenario from arising. Indeed, an 
informed debtor is aware that by filing bankruptcy she is establishing the 
bankruptcy estate. She has knowledge that any balance in her accounts on the 
petition date becomes property of the estate. Thus, the simplest solution is for the 
debtor to conduct the appropriate prepetition planning and wait until all 
outstanding checks have cleared before filing her petition. In no way does this 
prevent the debtor from paying ordinary bills prepetition. 
Rather, it just requires that she take certain steps to ensure that payments clear 
the bank prior to filing. This can be as simple as using cash or cashier’s checks in 
the period before filing. Moreover, if immediate filing is necessary, the debtor is in 
the best position to prevent any outstanding prepetition checks from clearing. For 
instance, the debtor can (1) put stop payment orders on the checks, (2) give the 
bank notice of the bankruptcy filing, or even (3) withdraw the funds and close the 
bank account. 
Ultimately, the policy-based arguments should not overshadow the plain text 
of § 542(a) and courts should not be spending time determining which way the 
various policy arguments cut. As noted by one court, “We are not free to impose 
our wishes to fashion an exception to the sometimes harsh results of section 
542(a).”200 Furthermore, it is not the “[c]ourt’s duty to create policy, but that of 
Congress.”201 Thus, “while judges might crave the freedom to always decree what 
                                                          
198 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2006). 
199 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, ¶ 704.02[3], at 704-9. 
200 Rajala v. Majors (In re Majors), 330 B.R. 880, 2005 WL 2077497, at *4 (B.A.P. 
10th Cir. Aug. 29, 2005) (unpublished table decision); see also In re Pauls, No. 10-13887, 
2011 WL 6096292, at *2 (Bankr. D. Kan. Dec. 5, 2011) (“[U]nfortunate facts do not soften 
the outcome that the law coldly compels.”). 
201 Redmond v. Miller (In re Miller), 378 B.R. 418, 2007 WL 2332391, at *3 (B.A.P. 
10th Cir. Aug. 16, 2007) (unpublished table decision). 
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is equitable and socially useful in the cases before [them] the Supreme Court says 
that [judges] do not possess it when a statute or rule provides clear direction.”202 
This plain meaning rule has even greater force when applied to the text of the 
Bankruptcy Code: 
 
Initially, it is worth recalling that Congress worked on the 
formulation of the Code for nearly a decade. It was intended to 
modernize the bankruptcy laws, and as a result made significant changes 
in both the substantive and procedural laws of bankruptcy . . . . In such a 
substantial overhaul of the system, it is not appropriate or realistic to 
expect Congress to have explained with particularity each step it took. 
Rather, as long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there 
generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of 
the statute. The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning [of a 
statute] begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of 
the statute itself.203 
 
The provisions of § 542(a) are clear, and allowing a trustee to recover the 
value of the funds from the debtor further comport with his duties under the 
Bankruptcy Code. And although a literal interpretation of § 542(a) may produce 
results that Congress may not have foreseen, legislation is the function of 
Congress, and Congress, not bankruptcy judges, must rewrite the Bankruptcy 
Code. The Supreme Court’s mandate for statutory construction clearly requires 
bankruptcy courts to enforce the plain meaning of a facially clear statute, in spite 
of policy implications or pre-Code practices to the contrary. Thus, under the 
analysis set forth above, even if the trustee is in a better position (which she is not) 
and has the option of recovering from others (which she does), in no way does that 
affect her right to recover from the debtor pursuant to § 542(a). 
The question is not who is in a better position or whether there will be 
unfortunate results. The question is what the Bankruptcy Code requires and what is 
in the best interests of the estate. Bankruptcy courts cannot disregard the clear 
provisions of federal and state law, which provide, at a minimum, that (1) a 
debtor’s interest in her bank account becomes property of the estate when she files 
her petition, and (2) although a debtor may not have possession of the funds 
represented by the checks written to creditors, she undeniably has control if the 
bank has not authorized, as a payor bank, final payment on such checks. Once the 
payor bank authorizes payment and the debtor no longer has possession or control 
of the funds, § 542(a) clearly entitles the trustee to a money judgment for the 
“value” of the funds. This result not only follows the plain meaning of § 542(a), 
but it is the only result that comports with the trustee’s duty to realize from the 
                                                          
202 Id. (quoting In re Horwitz, 167 B.R. 237, 241 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1994)) 
(emphasis added). 
203 In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 320 B.R. 523, 535 (D. Del. 2005) (quoting 
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1989)). 
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estate all that is possible for distribution among creditors and “close such estate as 




If a debtor writes checks against funds prepetition, but the checks do not clear 
the debtor’s account until after she files for bankruptcy, the trustee is entitled to a 
money judgment against the debtor for the value of the funds. Not only does this 
view comport with the clear text of § 542(a), it also may be the most practical and 
efficient way to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate. The text of § 542(a) 
is clear. An entity in possession, custody, or control of property of the estate during 
the bankruptcy case “shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or 
the value of such property.”205 Property of the estate is defined to include “all legal 
or equitable interests of the debtor.”206 Funds on deposit in a debtor’s bank account 
are undeniably property of the bankruptcy estate. 
This is true even if the debtor writes checks against the funds prepetition, but 
the checks do not clear the debtor’s account until after she files for bankruptcy. Up 
until the time the debtor’s checks are presented for payment, the debtor retains 
control over the balance in her account. She can close the account, withdraw the 
funds, or stop payment on the checks, regardless of any outstanding checks. This 
undeniably amounts to “possession, custody, or control” within the meaning of 
§ 542(a). Furthermore, the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code altered the pre-Code 
present possession or control requirement because § 542(a) expressly permits a 
trustee to recover “the value” of the property, in addition to the property itself, 
from one who possessed the property at any time “during the [bankruptcy] case.” 
Thus, present possession is no longer a prerequisite to turnover liability. Under 
such circumstances, a trustee can proceed directly against the debtor under 
§ 542(a) and courts are constrained by the Bankruptcy Code to hold the debtor 
liable to the estate for the value of the checks written prepetition, but cashed 
postpetition. 
While it is undoubtedly challenging for the debtor to pay twice and 
experience the “fresh start” intended by bankruptcy, the burden on the debtor is 
entirely irrelevant. It is well within the law and the trustee’s sound discretion to 
decide to recover the payments from the debtor instead of the payees under 
§ 542(a). This result not only follows the plain meaning of § 542(a), but—at 
times—it is the only result that comports with the trustee’s duty to realize from the 
estate all that is possible for distribution among creditors and “close such estate as 
expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest.”207 
While this may be an unfortunate result, it is entirely avoidable by prepetition 
planning on the debtor’s part. Debtors seeking to avoid the unpleasant result of 
                                                          
204 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2006). 
205 Id. § 542(a) (emphasis added). 
206 Id. § 541(a)(1). 
207 Id. § 704(a). 
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multiple payments should be certain that any checks they write prepetition have 
cleared before they file for bankruptcy. If immediate filing is necessary, the debtor 
can place stop payment orders on the checks, give the bank notice of the 
bankruptcy filing, or even withdraw the funds and close the bank account. 
